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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
THREE EMPIRICAL ESSAYS ON STARTUPS’ SURVIVAL USING THE KAUFFMAN
FIRM SURVEY
by
Mohamad Nassereddine
Florida International University, 2012
Miami, Florida
Professor Peter Thompson, Major Professor
This dissertation studies newly founded U.S. firms’ survival using three different releases
of the Kauffman Firm Survey. I study firms’ survival from a different perspective in each chapter.
The first essay studies firms’ survival through an analysis of their initial state at startup
and the current state of the firms as they gain maturity. The probability of survival is determined
using three probit models, using both firm-specific variables and an industry scale variable to
control for the environment of operation. The firm’s specific variables include size, experience
and leverage as a debt-to-value ratio. The results indicate that size and relevant experience are
both positive predictors for the initial and current states. Debt appears to be a predictor of exit if
not justified wisely by acquiring assets. As suggested previously in the literature, entering a
smaller-scale industry is a positive predictor of survival from birth. Finally, a smaller-scale
industry diminishes the negative effects of debt.
The second essay makes use of a hazard model to confirm that new service-providing
(SP) firms are more likely to survive than new product providers (PPs). I investigate the possible
explanations for the higher survival rate of SPs using a Cox proportional hazard model. I examine
six hypotheses (variations in capital per worker, expenses per worker, owners’ experience,
industry wages, assets and size), none of which appear to explain why SPs are more likely than
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PPs to survive. Two other possibilities are discussed: tax evasion and human/social relations, but
these could not be tested due to lack of data.
The third essay investigates women-owned firms’ higher failure rates using a Cox
proportional hazard on two models. I make use of a never-before used variable that proxies for
owners’ confidence. This variable represents the owners’ self-evaluated competitive advantage.
The first empirical model allows me to compare women’s and men’s hazard rates for
each variable. In the second model I successively add the variables that could potentially explain
why women have a higher failure rate. Unfortunately, I am not able to fully explain the gender
effect on the firms’ survival. Nonetheless, the second empirical approach allows me to confirm
that social and psychological differences among genders are important in explaining the higher
likelihood to fail in women-owned firms.
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INTRODUCTION
Economic sustainability and growth rely heavily on individuals’ ability and desire to
become entrepreneurs. According to the Small Business Administration (SBA), small businesses
comprise 99.7 percent of all employer firms in the U.S. economy. Needless to say, policies
designed to accommodate entrepreneurship and small businesses creation are necessary in order
to get the economy out of a recession and motivate job creation. Recently, President Obama
unveiled an economic plan to reduce unemployment by motivating job creation in the private
sector.
However, the recent economic downturn has pushed many companies out of business and
firms’ survival studies are now needed more than ever to comprehend what factors contribute to
firms’ survival in order to give small businesses a chance to remain in business and create jobs.
The recent release of the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS), a longitudinal dataset that
follows newly founded firms on a yearly basis, provided an opportunity to review previous
findings and contribute to the literature with new findings. This entire dissertation makes use of
the KFS to investigate three questions related to firm survival.
The first essay analyzes the effects of a firm’s current and founding conditions on its
survival. Prior to this research, studies such as Audretsch and Mahmood (1994) and Åstebro and
Bernhardt (2003) have reported evidence of the non-negligible effects of founding conditions on
a firm’s survival ability.
This motivates the question of why there is a lack of studies comparing current to
founding conditions’ effects on firms’ survival. To the best of my knowledge this question has yet
to be addressed. Moreover, previous studies lacked adequate data. For example, Åstebro and
Bernhardt (2003) used the “Characteristics of Business Owners”, which imposes a five-year gap
on the data waves. Other studies restricted their analysis to specific industries. The release of the
KFS allows me to remediate these data issues.
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I attempt to answer the question stated above through an empirical approach. Thus, using
probit models, I investigate the effects of variables in the literature that have been found to affect
firms’ survival. On the one hand, the effects of current conditions are estimated using the
probability of survival at time t using the independent variables measure at t t −1 . On the other
hand, the founding conditions effects represent the probability of survival at time t using the
variable measure at t 0 .
The literature has previously documented unambiguous positive effects of size (Geroski,
Mata and Portugal 2010; Mata and Portugal 1994) and experience (Thompson 2005; Klepper and
Simons 2003) on survival. I follow the literature and control for these variables as well.
Additionally, Audretsch and Mahmood (1994) confirm the importance of industry measures to
control for the environment of the firm. Thus, an industry dummy allows me to control for the
scale of operation within the industry that a firm operates in. Last, I add financial leverage
dummies to the model. Firms’ debt over assets ratio is calculated and attached to a corresponding
dummy measure (0, lower than 1, 1, greater than 1 and infinite). Previously, studies such as
Cooley and Quadrini (2001) claimed that debt was a determinant of failure. Åstebro and
Bernhardt (2003), however, claim that survival probability was increasing with external initial
debt.
The first chapter results allow me to reiterate the importance of size and experience on
firms’ survival. Moreover, I find that the effects of size are greater in the current conditions,
while the effects of experience are more important at foundation. Also, leverage seems to
decrease the firms’ survival prospects when the debt is not used to acquire assets. These results
on leverage hold true both in the current and founding conditions. Finally, the industry scale
measure seems to matter at entrance only (foundation). Firms entering a smaller-scale industry
are more likely to survive.
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The second essay examines which side of the product-service spectrum is most likely to
contribute to firms’ survival. That is, firms need to make the decision at startup to be a service
provider(s) (SP), a product provider(s) (PP) or a provider of both services and products (PB). I am
not aware of any study in the literature that tackles firms’ survival from this perspective. This
essay was motivated by the hole found in the literature and thus represents an attempt to better
understand which factors motivate firms’ survival.
The survival analysis is conducted using a Cox proportional hazard model. The first goal
of the paper is to provide proof that one side of the product-service spectrum is indeed more
likely to survive than the other. I focus the study on SPs and PPs. The firms were part of the KFS
in which firms respondents were asked if they provide services, products or both. Thus, each firm
was associated with a dummy variable. The results indicate that SPs were associated with lower
failure. In a continuing endeavor, I test six hypotheses (which could explain the hazard rate
behavior). The survival associated with being an SP or a PP is tested using these hypotheses first
individually and then by successively adding them. The hypotheses (capital per worker, expenses
per worker, owners’ experience, size, assets and industry wage) are stated using the variables on
which SPs and PPs differ the most, together with the literature on firms’ survival.
The study provides insights on factors that could promote PPs’ and SPs’ survival. For
instance, I find that capital per worker is the most important contributor to PPs’ survival ability. I
also find that an increase in assets increases PPs’ failure rates once size is controlled for.
Unfortunately, I am not able to explain empirically the reasons behind PPs’ higher failure rates.
Thus, I suggest that SPs’ higher ability to evade taxes and customers’ retention ability should be
the next hypotheses to be tested.
The third essay contributes to the owners’ gender firms’ survival literature. There are
disagreements among researchers on whether women-owned firms are more likely to fail. On the
one hand, a majority of the research (Boden and Nucci 2000; Carter, Williams and Reynolds
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1997) confirms that women-owned firms are associated with higher failure rates. On the other
hand, papers such as Kalleberg and Leicht (1991), found no negative effects of gender on
survival.
An overwhelming number of studies have tried to explain the gender effect on survival
through variables on which women-and men-owned companies differ greatly. The variables
mostly represented human capital measures, industry of operation, firm’s size and financial
capital structure. However, evidence suggests that differences across genders exist as well at
social and psychological level.
The KFS provides two variables that could be used as proxies for social and
psychological measures. The first one is home-operated businesses. Women tend to be more
likely to operate their businesses from home, and Boden and Nucci (2000) reported that
businesses operating from home use less financial capital at startup. Furthermore, Boden and
Nucci found that startup financial capital was positively linked to business survival. Owners’
were asked by the Kauffman Foundation if they believed they had a competitive advantage. Thus,
I use this self-reported judgment variable as a proxy of owners’ confidence.
I use the home-operated dummy and the competitive advantage dummy, along with other
measures found in the literature (size, experience, debt and equity), within two survival models
with Cox specifications. The first model is used on both women- and men-owned firms’
subsamples. I find that women have better coefficients for survival on most variables, indicating
that the gender effect on firms’ survival is most probably the result of differences within these
variables. For instance, women may benefit from a greater effect on survival from hiring a
marginal employee, but men have more employees. Competitive advantage, however, seem to be
more beneficial to men. After confirming that women-owned companies within the KFS were
more likely to fail, I pursue my investigation and add the variables successively with the
corresponding gender’s interaction variables. Although I was not able to completely explain the
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gender effect on firms’ survival, the last model—which adds the competitive advantage
dummy—indicates that psychological differences among genders are an important factor in
explaining women-owned firms’ higher failure rates.
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CHAPTER 1
Startups Survival Analysis using the Kauffman Firm Survey: An Analysis of Founding and
Current Conditions on Survival.
1.1 Introduction
This paper reports the results of a study of the effects of current and founding conditions
on firm survival using the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS). We know from prior work that a firm’s
founding conditions have persistent effects on its survival and growth (Mata and Portugal 1994,
Mata et al. 1995, Audretsch and Mahmood 1994, Carroll et al. 1996, Åstebro and Bernhardt
2003, Huynh et al. 2008, Geroski et al. 2010), but data limitations have left us with many
unanswered questions.
Empirical research on survival or growth requires a dataset with three characteristics: a
large sample containing a large range of sizes, firms that are followed from birth and short
intervals between follow ups. Before the KFS, research on firm dynamics were conducted on
databases each lacking one or more of the needed characteristics. For example, Åstebro and
Bernhardt (2003) use a sample of firms taken from the “Characteristics of Business Owners”
(CBO), a survey published by the US Census in 1982, 1987 and 1992. The study was conducted
on a sample from the survey of new firms created in 1987 and the sample is checked again in
1992, a five year gap, to determine who survived. A five-year gap is a large gap in time, enough
to suggest that their results could be improved. Some of the firms found dead in 1992 could have
died in 1988 or later.
The Kauffman Firm Survey is a new panel dataset on firms created in 2004, and firms are
followed consistently every year. The KFS has all the needed characteristics and presents a
bonus. It surveys a large range of industries. This paper contributes to the literature by filling
some of the gaps brought about by the lack of data availability regarding the different firm and

7

industry specific variables. I use the KFS to check on the reliability of past research conducted in
the literature by studying the current state effects on survival together with the initial state.
Growth and survival analyses have been relatively well covered in the literature on firm
dynamics. Both areas share common variables such as size 1 , experience and owners’
characteristics just to cite a few. Gibrat’s Law2 states that a firm’s growth rate is independent of
its size. Past studies have provided empirical evidence suggesting that Gibrat’s Law could be
wrong or at least wrong to some extent (Kumar 1985, Evans 1987, Hall 1987). Hall (1987) rejects
Gibrat’s law for small firms although she accepts the law for larger firms. Evans (1987) shows
that the growth rate and its variance are negatively correlated with a firm’s size and age. Evans
also reported that survival was increasing with age, a result found in other studies (Dunne et al.
1989). Evans reinforced Hall, confirming that Gibrat’s Law was indeed holding for larger firms.
Dunne et al. (1989) conducted their study on the growth and failure of manufacturing plants.
Their results suggested that failure rates decline with plant size and age.
Few models have been developed to explain these age effects. Among them, Cooley and
Quadrini (2001) is notable. Cooley and Quadrini (2001) added a theoretical model of size (equity)
and age effects on firm’s dynamics, providing a significant contribution to the firm’s dynamics
literature. They differentiate their contribution from previous research by taking both size and age
dependency into consideration simultaneously, after introducing financial frictions into the
model. Cooley and Quadrini claim that debt matters and is a cause of failure. The model depicted
by Cooley and Quadrini predicts that younger firms tend to take on more debt which in turn
increases the volatility of their profits, thus increasing their failure rate.
1

The empirical literature has been more developed on the subject with papers such as Dunne et al. (1989);
Mitchell (1994), Audretsch and Mahmood (1994), Haveman (1995), Geroski et al. (2010) Huynh et al.
(2008). Theoretically, on the other hand, size effects on growth and survival is harder to find. Jonavovic
(1982), a reference, assumes that initial size does not matter and current size includes all the information
on the firm history allowing survival or exit. This is contrary to some of the empirical findings cited above
reporting the importance of initial size for survival.
2

See Sutton (1997).
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Although the age hypothesis cannot be tested directly using the KFS (all firms are part of
the same cohort together with the KFS being a relatively new dataset), it is tested for indirectly
through the debt hypothesis. Financial conditions (debt, equity and leverage) have also been a
critical part of firms’ dynamics in the literature and the KFS offers a full range of data available at
every life stage of the financial health of the company. Cooley and Quadrini also found that
leverage (described as debt over equity) was decreasing with firm’s size because smaller firms
take on more debt. Relating these findings to the size and survival literature (probability of exit
decreases with size), I can assume that the probability of exit should be decreasing with leverage.
Åstebro and Bernhardt (2003) studied the initial financing conditions of the firm effects on
survival. They argue that probability of survival is increasing with initial external debt, although a
negative correlation exists between initial bank loans and survival. On the other hand, Huynh et
al. (2008) suggest that a firm’s exit probability is increasing with leverage3.
I test for the effects of quality using years of experience in the industry, as suggested by
Thompson (2005). A literature promoting experience as an important contributor to survival has
been developed. Research has tackled two main areas pertaining to firms’ experience. First, past
studies 4 find the effects on owners’ pre-entry experience to be a persistent determinant of
performance in the years following entry. Second, the more related the experience is to the
industry in which the firm operates the more valuable it is. Thompson studies both effects in the
shipbuilding industry and his findings reinforce Klepper and Simons’ (2000) suggestion that
firms with more experience in related fields of the industry perform better than de novo entrants
with less experience.

3

Huynh et al. (2008) describe leverage as debt over assets. Exit is increasing with the leverage variable
and therefore with debt value relative to asset value (leverage= debt /assets). This is the definition I use in
the paper. This confirms the results found by Cooley and Quadrini (2001).
4

Carroll et al. (1996), Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001).
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Firm-specific characteristics are not the only major predictors of survival and growth.
The environment in which the firm operates is also significant. Audretsch (1991), and Audretsch
and Mahmood (1994) emphasize the need to consider the industry together with firm
characteristics. I introduce a dummy representing the scale of the industry in which the firm
operates. The minimum efficient scale (MES) specific to an industry could be an important
determinant of survival. Growth constraints indicate that the higher the scale of the industry the
more difficult it is for firms to reach the MES.
I make use of probit regressions, which allows me to estimate the effects of current and
initial conditions on the firm’s survival in the following period for every year the firm stays alive.
The current conditions’ effects on survival are estimated, letting me determine how the state of
the company during a year affects its survival next year. The initial state effects are obtained the
same way but only regressing on founding conditions variables. On one hand, the study finds that
size is a more important positive predictor of survival in the current condition although I do find
the founding conditions to be a significant positive predictor of survival as well. On the other
hand, the relevance of owners experience is a more important positive predictor of survival in the
founding stage. Current relevant owners’ experience is also found to be a positive contributor to
survival. Both stages associate diminishing returns to relevance of owners’ experience.
The probability of survival seems to be decreasing with leverage. The companies that
have negative equity seem to be the most prone to exit. Evidently, a firm needs to use the debt it
owes adequately or debt will drive the firm to exit. Entering a lower scale industry seems to
increase the probability of survival and the results are significant in the first year and in the years
following entrance. It is the choice of entrance into an industry that is significant as opposed to
the yearly activity in a low scale industry. Moreover, entrance in a low scale industry decreases
the negative effect of debt.
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The first section of the paper describes the Kauffman Firm Survey and provides summary
statistics on the full dataset. The second section introduces the variables used, in addition to
providing a description of three different models. A brief literature review accompanies the model
descriptions. The third section presents the results in two parts. The first part analyses the current
year condition on survival and the second part adds the effects on survival of initial condition.
Finally, I conclude the paper with a summary of the findings and a discussion for future research
possibilities.
1.2 The Kauffman Firm Survey
I use the public release of the KFS, a panel data set covering a broad range of topics,
allowing the study of a sample of firms created in 2004. The dataset contains information on a
variety of topics including financing, organizational structure and legal status, business
characteristics and strategy, owners demographics and work behavior.
The KFS is based on a random sample of businesses--from the Dun and Bradstreet (DB)
database—created in 2004. The questionnaires sent to the sample were designed by the
Mathematica Policy Research. The baseline questionnaire was sent in 2004 and due to the quest
for a longitudinal database, follow-up questionnaires were sent every following year. So far
adding to the baseline are three following waves consisting of 2005, 2006 and 2007 data.
`The development and change aspects involved with innovations in high-tech industries
motivated the Foundation to oversample firms in these fields. The screening/eligibility test
allowed only 15 percent of the potential pool of firms to be part of the sample. The initial sample
of firms passed “the eligibility test” defining a new business in 2004 and consisted of 4,928 firms
out of an initial pool of 32,429 businesses. Respondents were paid $50 to answer using a selfadministered web survey or a computer-assisted telephone interview.
Eligibility was determined with two tests. A firm had to be a new company and it had to
be a company created individually by de novo entrepreneurs. The first test ensures that the
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company had started its activity in 2004. Therefore, if the firm had started activity in 2003 (or
earlier) under any other form of structure and the 2004 initial year of activity for example only
marked a restructuring (e.g., sold business, renamed business, or change in activity), the firm did
not qualify to be part of the sample. The second test checked ownership and provenance of the
firm. It could not be a subsidiary of any other business, could not have been a spin off, nor
inherited by previous owners. Finally, it could not be a not-for-profit company. Firms that passed
both tests were part of the sample in the baseline questionnaire and follow ups. The baseline
questionnaire records data at the birth of the firm, and therefore is used as the initial conditions of
operation in the study.
As previously stated, there are four waves available in the current Kauffman Firm
Survey. Firms that participated in the first wave satisfied two conditions. They first needed to be
part of the baseline sample, and needed to have survived the first year of activity. The first wave
found that 7.4 percent (6 percent plus 1.4 percent) of the 4,928 (369) were out of business by the
end of 2005 (see Table 1.1). There were 4,523 businesses left in 2005. More businesses were
found have closed by the time of the second and third follow ups. Some of the surviving firms
chose not to answer and sample weights were adjusted accordingly.
The possible reasons for exit were determined at the beginning of the survey. Firms that
ceased operation temporarily were a small minority in the sample. In the first year 3 percent of
the sample temporarily ceased operation, 3.1 percent in the second and 1.7 percent in the third
year. I exclude those firms from the study because the survey extends four years. A firm
described as active in any year had to have been described as active in all previous years. A firm
that ceased operation temporarily (for example one that exits in 2005 and is seen as reappearing
in 2007) is dropped from the sample (36 observations were dropped).
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Any reason that will bring the respondents to declare that the same original business is no
longer in operation, with at least one of the original founders is defined as inactive in my study5.
Hence, businesses that were sold or that merged with other businesses were also described as
closed because of the change in ownership. Only 1.4 percent of the businesses were sold or
merged the first year, compared with 1.3 percent and 0.8 percent respectively in the second and
third years.
Table 1.1
Firms’ Outcomes (2004-2007)6 in Percentages
Year

2005

2006

2007

Survived

89.6

80.2

73.4

Closed operations

6.0

14.0

21.4

Sold to or merged with another business

1.4

2.7

3.5

Temporarily ceased operations or other

3.0

3.1

1.7

100.0

100.0

100.0

TOTAL

Source: Kauffman Firm Survey Microdata. Sample includes only surviving firms over the 2004-2007
period, and firms that have been verified as going out of business over the same period. The original
sample size in 2004 was 4,928.

Some firms were reported to have no owner in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007, and were
dropped from the sample (respectively, 41, 22, 23 and 16 observations were deleted). Some firms
surveyed could also be firms created to reduce taxes on an individual. It has been shown in prior
research, both theoretical and empirical (Gordon 1998, Åstebro and Bernhadt 2003), that paying
fewer taxes could be an incentive for individuals to create companies as a tax shelter because
corporate tax rules are often advantageous compared to income tax. Hence, I expect some of the
firms surveyed were also created as tax shelters. The way I chose to correct for this issue was to
drop the firms that reported no sales in all years of activity (58 observations were deleted).
5

Hall (1987) considers mergers as the exit of two firms and the creation of a new firm. The creation of a
new firm is irrelevant in my study.
6

From A. Robb et al. “An overview of the Kauffman Firm Survey”, Results from the 2004-2007 Data”,
2009
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Table 1.2
Firms’ Distribution by Industry7 in Percentages

Industry names and (code)
Professional (54),
Management, and Educational Services (61)
Retail Trade (44)
Administrative and Support, and Waste
Management and Remediation Services (56)
Construction (23)
Other Services (except Public Administration) (81)
Manufacturing (31)
Wholesale Trade (42)
Real Estate, Rental and Leasing (53)
Finance and Insurance (52)
Health Care and Social Assistance (62)
Information (51)
Transportation and Warehousing (48)
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation (71)
Accommodation and Food Services (72)
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and hunting (11)
Mining (21)
Utilities (22)
Management of Companies and Enterprises (55)

KFS New
Employer
Businesses

Census
Employer
Firm
Births

PSED
New
Businesses

15.5

14.1

16.1

15.6

12

18.6

11.4

6

2.1

9.8
8
7.2
6
3.7
4.7
4.2
2.6
2.9
3.1
3.9
1.4
0
0
0

15.7
8.5
3.2
4.5
5.1
2.2
7.7
1.4
3.3
2.1
9.1
0.4
0.3
0.1
0.1

10
0.3
3.5
1.5
5.3
3.1
2.9
4.2
2.4
3.2
10.9
2
0.5
0.5
6.7

0
2.2
5.6
Unclassified (99)
Source: Kauffman Firm Survey, Baseline data: Tabulations by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc;
and Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, from longitudinal data (established
with some first-quarter payroll) provided by the U.S. Census Bureau; Reynolds, P. 2004.
Entrepreneurship in the United States Assesment, Miami, Fla: Florida International University.

The distribution of firms by industry shows by comparison to the U.S Census that the
KFS has a higher proportions of businesses in many industries such as manufacturing,
professional management, education, retail and wholesale, finance and insurance, just to cite a
few. However, the KFS has a lower proportion of firms in construction, health care and social
assistance, and accommodation and food services (see Table 1.2).
7

From A. Robb et al. “An overview of the Kauffman Firm Survey”, Results from the 2004-2007 Data”,
2009
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The sample surveyed shows that the majority of firms start as small with fewer than 5
employees (75.1 percent). Also, the distribution of firms by size shows similarities with the
Census. For example, 10.35 percent of the KFS sample start with 10 or more employees,
compared to 10.4 percent8 in the Census. Table 1.3 also shows that the KFS was not able to
capture any firm in its sample with 500 employees or more. The Foundation suggests this could
be because few firms have the capacity to begin at such a large scale. Note that the number of
small firms with fewer than 5 employees and the ones with 20 or more employees are a bigger
part of the distribution by 2007. On the other hand, firms with 5 to 19 employees are a smaller
part of the distribution by 2007.
Table 1.3
Distribution of Firms by Employment Size Category9 in Percentages

Number of Employees

All firms in 2004

All surviving Firms in 2007

1-4

75.1

76.7

5-9

14.6

13.0

10-19

6.6

6.0

20-99

3.4

3.8

100-499

0.3

0.4

500+

0.0

0.010

Source: Kauffman Firm Survey, Baseline data; Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small
Business Administration, Statistics of U.S. businesses, U.S. Census, 2004.

The KFS reports an 89.6 percent survival rate in the first year of activity. This rate is
higher than those found in previous studies. For instance, the U.S. Small Business Administration
8

A. Robb et al. “An overview of the Kauffman Firm Survey”, results from the 2004-2007 data”, 2009.

9

From A. Robb et al. “An overview of the Kauffman Firm Survey”, results from the 2004-2007 data”,
2009.

10

This number rounds to 0.0. Actual number is 0.04.
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found the survival rate of single establishment firms founded in 1997 was only 75 percent in the
first year. The CBO has found rates similar to the U.S. Small Business Administration for
different cohorts of single establishment firms (Shane, 2008). The KFS could be registering
higher rates for a simple reason: firms created in the beginning of 2004 and closing shortly after
may have been omitted from the sample due to the screening method. Therefore, a firm that
would have closed before the baseline survey was issued in 2005 could not be part of the
sample11.
1.3 Variable Description and Model Specification
•

The variables
The KFS reports a wide range of information regarding the birth and evolution of

establishments in the sample. I concentrate on a small part of the firms’ descriptive and financial
variables. I also took into consideration the industry in which the firms operate because the
environment of operation could affect survival rates (Huynh et al. 2008, Thompson 2005, Mata
and Portugal 1994.) The variable describing survival is the dependant variable and takes the form
of a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is active (survived), and equal to 0 if inactive (out of business)
respectively during 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007.
Only firms created in 2004 and that survived the first year are part of the sample. As
previously stated, a firm is considered to be out of business if it was sold to another business,
merged with another business, has temporarily stopped operation (those observations were
dropped) or just closed. To correct for non-response, I added the condition that a firm needed to
be active in the previous year as well. Thus, survival in a current period is equal to 1 only if
survival in the previous period is also equal to 1 and the business has not been declared to be out
of business in the current period.
11

Hall (1987) suggests that the sample bias created by the earlier death probability of younger firms is not a
problem in her study of growth.
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I created three models. The first two models (M1 and M2) control for firm specific
variables, with M2 adding leverage dummies to M1. M3 completes the series, adding an industry
specific variable. I use the total number of employees on the firm’s payroll (part time and full
time) to proxy for the size of the firm. Most reasonable measures of size are positive functions of
number of employees. The total value of assets and revenues could be good proxies for size but I
believe that the number of employees is a better proxy. The reason is straightforward. The value
of assets recorded in the KFS is most likely the book value, and therefore, has depreciation
accounted for. Thus, although the firm can remain the same size from one year to the next, its
recorded asset value will decrease. Moreover, firm’s asset value described by the survey is
classified in range variables. I could not use sales as a measure of size for the same reason. Thus
the proxy for size is the first control variable on the right hand side (RHS) of M1. The total
number of employees variable does not include the number of owner-operators. Regressions were
run adding the number of owner-operators to the total number of employees and results were
found to be similar12.
The survey reports the years of experience each owner has in the industry previous to the
creation of the firm, giving me the second control variable on the RHS of M1- owners’ previous
industry experience proxies for quality of the firm. The intuition is that the more the owners have
experience in the related industry prior to starting the firm, the higher the probability for it to be
of a higher quality. Thompson (2005) studies the effects of previous years of experience in the
industry in which the firm competes and finds it to be highly significant and important. I adopt
the same approach.
I constructed the experience of the firm by calculating the mean experience brought in by
each owner. The survey has an upper bound for years of experience equal to 40 years. Whether

12

See Appendix 1.1 for results of first year regression on current conditions and last year regression on
initial conditions using M3.
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the corresponding owner has 41 or more years of experience, he/she is registered as having 40+
years of experience bringing me to censor the years of experience variable from above, and lock
it to a maximum of 40. Assuming decreasing returns to experience, censoring from above should
have little or no consequence. The latter assumption means that the marginal product of human
capital is assumed to be decreasing. The argument could be made in which mean owners’ relevant
experience is not the best measure of the firm’s experience. An average weighted according to the
time put in the company by each owner would be a better measure. The more an owner works in
the company, the higher the weight of his experience. Unfortunately, this method is impossible to
apply given the data. The possibility of decreasing returns to experience is allowed for by
including the square of the relevant experience.
Following the literature13, each firm in each period had their leverage calculated as a debt
to value ratio14 defined as debt over assets and both values are reported by the survey. The KFS
describes “total debts” to be the sum of the total debt owed by the owners’15and in the business’
name.16 “Total assets” is the sum of all assets held by the firm. The dataset reports range variables
for “total debt” and “total assets.”17 Operations not being possible on range variables, I use the
ranges’ midpoints as point of reference (I did not have access to the ranges’ means and medians).
The use of the median technique has been exploited in previous research 18 including some

13

See Cooley and Quadrini (2001) and Huynh et al. (2008).

14

Debt to value =debt / (debt+equity) = debt / assets and debt = assets – equity.

15

Debt taken by owner = personal credit cards balance, personal loans taken from bank or family members
or any other creditor, business credit cards for which the owner is responsible.

16

Debt taken under business name= credit cards balance established for the business, bank loans for the
business, credit line of business, any other kind of loans taken under the business name (such as family,
government, employees, other businesses).

17

The survey classifies financial information under range variables.
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Kennickell (1997) suggests that range variables reported in the Survey of Consumer Finances is a
limitation to research and thus suggests in Kennickell (1998) to use the midpoints of the respective ranges.
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working papers using the KFS19 and is accepted as an admissible replacement for real values.
Asset values are book values and therefore are subject to depreciation.
A firm’s calculated leverage is classified into dummy variables (five dummies were
created). A leverage dummy equal to 0 at a given period means that the firm has not reported any
debt and therefore the firm is financed entirely by equity (because of collinearity, this dummy
was omitted from the regression). A leverage higher than 0 and lower than 1 in a given period
means that the firm reported some existing debts of an amount smaller than its assets value and
some positive equity was reported by the firm. A company that finances its assets completely
with debt in a given time shows a leverage equal to 1. A leverage equal to 1 means that the
company has no equity or no equity left. An overleveraged firm has a leverage greater than 1 and
has negative equity. The assets value is worth less than the debt owed by the firm. It could also be
an indication that the firm has used some of the debt to pay for services or other aspects of
business not describable as assets. I expect to see a negative value on this leverage. An infinite
leverage20 is the worst situation for a firm and could be thought of as a firm that borrowed money
but has no assets to justify the debt. The firm spent the entire amount of the debt on expenses
without accumulating any form of assets (e.g., locals, stock, machinery etc). I expect the
coefficient attributed to this variable to be the most negative in the regressions. A firm with
infinite leverage only has negative equity.

19

The working paper by Braymen and Neymotin entitled “Immigrant enclaves and the success of
entrepreneurial ventures” (december 2, 2009) assigned midpoints to the range variables whenever the
respondent was asked to choose a range in the KFS. Robb and Coleman’s working paper entitled “The
impact of financial capital on business performance: a comparison of women- and men-owned firms” (may
7, 2009) uses a similar approach.
20

Although a division by 0 is algebraically undefined, the reader must consider that the assets’ value is
never really 0. The value of assets is more likely to tend to 0 so the limit on the ratio goes to infinity.
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Table 1.4
Percentage in Two-digit Industries with Fewer than 20 Employees in 2004

Industry description

Forestry, fishing, hunting, and agriculture
support
Mining

Firms
with
number
of
employees
below 20
93%
82%

Utilities

71%

Construction

91%

Manufacturing

69%

Wholesale trade

86%

Retail trade

86%

Transportation and warehousing

83%

Information

80%

Finance and insurance

90%

Real estate and rental and leasing

95%

Professional, scientific, and technical
services
Management of companies and enterprises

92%

Administrative and support and waste
management and Rremediation services

83%

Educational services

76%

Health care and social assistance

85%

Arts, entertainment, and recreation

84%

Accommodation and food services

72%

Other services (except public
administration)

93%

66%

Note: The percentages represent how many firms employing
the number of employees described by the scale variable can
be found in the industry as of 2004.

The scale variable represents the percentage of firms in the observation’s two-digit
industry that employs fewer than 20 employees (see Table 1.4). Åstebro and Bernhardt (2003),
use two variables for 1 to 19 employees and 1 to 49 employees, the first variable being a subset of
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the second. Regressions were run using Åstebro and Bernhardt and adding their variables do not
add explanatory power to the study (The results can be found in Appendix 1.2).
•

Model specification
The dependent variable of interest (survival in a given period) is a dichotomous

qualitative variable with outcomes survive=1 and exit=0. Therefore, a binary response regression
model is needed in order to quantify the probability of survival. This study will use probit. As
stated in the previous section, there are three model specifications. Each specification was run for
survival in 2005, 2006 and 2007.
It is perhaps unusual to run separate regressions in order to capture the evolution of each
variable over time and their influence on survival from one year to the next. Researchers usually
use weighted regression models over many years (Geroski et al. 2010, Huynhh et al. 2008).
Hazard models seem to be the most used tool of analysis although Mata and Portugal (1994)
found similar results no matter the regressions (Weibull, ordered probit, ordered logit, Cox
proportional hazard) using different model specifications, different assumptions of distribution
and different sample definition. Hence probit should be just as effective and it has the advantage
to be an easier model. The disadvantage of running separate probit regressions is that time effects
cannot be controlled for. However, using the KFS, I only have access to one cohort of firms
created in 2004. Thus, no age variable could be used in the regression and I could not test directly
the age theory (this means that there is no age effect because firms are all the same age).
Moreover, Thompson (2005) shows that the age effect on exit is eliminated when quality proxies
are added to the regression. Thompson (2005) uses prior experience to proxy for quality and
concludes that the age effect found on survival could be explained by selection bias. Hence, a
separate probit should be a good tool of analysis.
Assuming that the total number of employees is a good proxy for size and considering
that it has been used as such in many papers (Geroski et al. 2010, Mata and Portugal 1994), I
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introduce it as a control variable in the base regression model. The M1 model is a simple model
that controls only for size and quality, using total number of employees and the owners’ mean
industry experience as respective proxies. Decreasing returns to experience were also allowed for
by using the square of the mean relevant experience variable.
Some studies have been conducted on the determinants of growth over time, while others
have focused on the initial starting size (Dunne et al. 1989, Mata and Portugal 1994, Haveman
1995, Audretsh and Mahmood 1994, Geroski et al. 2010, Sharma and Kesner 1996, Mitchell
1994). A simple reason for the higher failure rate of smaller firms is that larger firms have the
option to downsize when needed (cut expenses). Moreover, in difficult times, larger firms can
withdraw from dying markets and refocus on the ones still alive. The withdrawing choice is more
difficult for smaller firms because of the smaller scope of their operations. Others 21 have
suggested that larger firms are less susceptible to financial constraints and therefore have access
to funds during unexpected difficult times or even to finance projects. An interesting alternative
explanation deals with the costs of production. There are lower costs associated with producing at
a larger scale (Lucas 1978). These lower costs could happen for two reasons. First, a larger size
allows the firm to operate further down the cost curve. The second reason is that fewer financial
constraints allow the firm to operate at higher scale. Moreover, the bigger a firm is, the closer to
the minimum efficient scale (MES) of production it is and the lower its costs of production.
Geroski et al. (2010) also report a non-instantaneous increase in survival prospects as a firm’s
size increases. This latter relationship between survival and size is partly consistent with
Jovanovic (1982), in which firms adjust their size instantaneously (by learning about their
efficiency as time goes by) according to past performance, and only current size matters in
predicting survivability. The KFS allows me to see if size is indeed an increasing factor of
21

Fazzari et al. (1988) was a pioneer paper that asked the cash flow effect on investment question.
Zingales 1998, like Fazzari et al. (1998), study the effect of capital market imperfections on survival. They
find that highly leveraged firms are less likely to survive.
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survivability22. Regarding the founding conditions, entering larger sends a positive signal and
relaxes the liquidity constraints proposed by Evans and Jovanovic (1989). Thus, I expect positive
and significant coefficients on the number of employees in both current and founding conditions
regressions.
Pre-entry relevant experience has also been shown to be an important predictor of
survival. After showing pre-entry relevant experience to be a good proxy for quality, Thompson
(2005) affirms that relevant experience does indeed have persistent effects on survival and
moreover, the effects do not decay over a long period of time. Geroski et al. (2010) indirectly test
the hypothesis (following previous research like Wernerfelt 1984, Barney 1991 and Youndt et al.
1996) that human capital is the factor that provides the hedge because it cannot be replicated by
the competitors. Geroski et al. (2010) use education as a proxy for human capital, and find that
education reduces the hazard of exit. Lucas (1978) shows that having better quality human capital
allows a firm to lower its cost at any given level of production, thus seeking to produce at a larger
scale.
The link between financial variables and firm dynamics has just recently started to attract
the attention of researchers. Lack of financial data was the main reason empirical studies proved
to be a challenge. Firms are reluctant to disclose information regarding their financial structure.
Whenever the financial data is available, sampled firms are already too old and have already
overcome the first stages of growth. We know that younger firms grow faster than older, and that
survival is positively related to age (Evans 1987, Dunne et al. 1989). Thus, if the sample is aged,
we can assume that exit rates will be too low to conduct interesting research. This is commonly
referred to as a sample bias problem23.
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I do find an increase in the coefficient on size for the second year. I also find that the coefficient on size
is greater on current state than the coefficient on initial state.
23

See Hall (1987).
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The model M2 adds five financial leverage dummies to the base model. Huynh et al.
(2008) used quintiles dummies and found that the nonlinear model fitted the data better than the
linear one. Thus, adding dummies to the regression (different slopes) helps me model the
nonlinear property of leverage on survival.
Cases were found with reported assets value equal to 0. These observations are associated
with an infinite ratio representing the worst case of financial state for the firm. No debt was
reported in some cases and, as previously stated, the corresponding dummy was omitted from the
regression (for collinearity purposes).
There is empirical evidence reporting that higher debt decreases the probability of
survival. Huynh et al. (2009) found that once they control for size and productivity, firms with
high level of leverage (debt to value ratio measured debt over assets) face an increasing failure
risk with an increase in leverage. Alternatively, firms with low to moderate leverage have higher
survival chances. Huynh et al. (2008) look at the introduction of the initial debt to value ratio into
the firm dynamics and found it to be economically and statistically significant. They find that the
higher the debt to asset ratio is at birth, the lower the life expectancy of the firm. However, it is to
be noted that it is the increase in the debt to asset ratio that is dangerous and therefore it could
either be an increase in debt or a decrease in asset value (book value depreciation maybe).Myers
(1977) had already suggested that higher level of debt may limit a firm’s real value. Access to
debt can influence survival trough both a positive and a negative relation. On the one hand, the
more a firm has access to debt, the more it can finance its activities and therefore survive. On the
other hand, the more debt a firm owes, the higher the temptation to walk away from the debt
when found in harsh economic conditions. The debt to value ratio allows me to measure the
financial obligations of a firm for each value unit of assets (book value) it has. Huynh et al.
(2009) control simultaneously for size, age and leverage and find that initial asset value had a
positive effect on growth, providing evidence to the “deep pocket theory” suggested by Zingales
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(1998). The higher the asset stock at creation, the more positive the message sent to debt
institutions and the more the firm has access to debt to finance its growth.
Huynh, Petronia and Voia research was conducted on the startup financial conditions and
on a sample of manufacturing firms. Actually, most of the papers I have come across testing for
leverage effects (financial conditions) onto survival or growth were done on a sample of
manufacturing firms. Those results should be tested on other industries due to the fact that the
manufacturing industry is highly capital-intensive. The KFS also provides me with a higher range
of smaller industries. The interesting question would be whether or not increasing debt in the firm
youth is a predictor of exit, while controlling for industry scale? This question will be addressed
in the third model.
The literature on firm dynamics emphasizes the importance of industry specific variables
along firm specific variables. Audretsch (1991) looks at industrial variables effects on survival
and found that survival rates do vary across industries; a finding that previous empirical research
had not reported. Audretsch indicates that industry’s specific technical conditions as well as
industry’s demand are important predictors of survival. Audretsch and Mahmood (1994), expends
Audretsch (1991) by adding macro variables and firm level variables such as size and ownership.
Audretsch and Mahmood (1994) shows that size, when added to industry scale variables, can
influence survival positively and thus reduce the negative effects of higher scale on survival. The
literature 24 indicates that the bigger a firm is, the closer it will be to the MES and therefore
operate at a lower point on the cost curve, reducing cost and increasing profit, thus increasing
chances of survival.
The third model adds a scale variable defined as the percentage of firms found in the two
digits NAICS industry code in 2004 (represents date of entry for the sample) with fewer than 20
employees. Åstebro and Bernhadt (2003) find entering a small scale industry is a positive
24

Geroski et al. (2010), Mata and Portugal (1994).
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predictor of survival while entering a high scale industry is a negative predictor of survival.
Åstebro and Bernhadt run probit regressions and found that initial entrance into a higher scale
industry is a hazard for survival. The coefficient attributed to their variable representing a scale of
fewer than 50 employees was negative and twice as big in magnitude as compared to the
coefficient on the variable representing a scale of fewer than 20 employees (positive sign). The
research and results provided by Åstebro and Bernhadt are only giving information on the
founding conditions. I am not aware of a study that joins a leverage variable to an industry scale
variable. I trust that M3 will help understand whether the impact of debt is increased or decreased
when industry scale is controlled for.
Audretsch and Mahmood (1994) have studied the effect of concentration in an industry
on survival and they have found it to be significantly negative. Geroski et al. (2010) suggest the
more concentrated the industry at time of entry, the less the chances of exit, with the effects
disappearing post entry. Geroski et al. (2010)’s finding on industry concentration supports the
trial by fire hypothesis and suggests that the fittest survive in a highly concentrated market, hence
in reality high concentration at entry increases probability of exit for the unfit firms. Once a firm
enters a highly concentrated market and survives, it is more likely it will prosper in the future.
The scale variable proxies for the scale of the industry in which the observation is
operating. When the scale variable is not in the model, the number of employees accounts for its
effects via the MES theory. A firm’s large size represents the will to reach a higher scale of
operation bringing the coefficient on size down. Once the scale variable is added, correcting for
its effect on size, the coefficient on size should increase. Assuming Geroski et al. (2010) are right;
I should observe insignificant results on the years following entrance25. Moreover, assuming that
low scale industries are associated with high competitive forces—and conversely that high scale
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Concentration was found insignificant in previous studies like Mata and Portugal (1994) and
Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht (2004).
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industries are associated with strong negative forces at entrance due to incumbents’ market
control—entry in a low scale industry should decrease26 probability of survival.
1.4 Empirical Results
•

Effects of current year conditions on survival in the following period
Results for this section are presented in Tables 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7. The model M1 returns a

positive, significant and persistent effect of size on survival. The literature has reported that the
bigger a firm is, the more it can access external debt27 to finance growth and survive (Dunne et al.
1989, Thompson 2005). The coefficients found for each year on size suggest that size contributes
consistently to the probability of survival next year.
The coefficient on the total number of employees goes up once the industry scale is
accounted for in 2005 and 2006. An increase on the total number of employees’ coefficient is
expected because we know that total number of employees accounts for at least two effects in
M1and M2. First, how successful the firm is (the more employees the firm has, the better it is
doing)—this effect is positive. Second, how much employees are needed in the industry (the more
employees a firm has the higher the probability it is in a higher scale industry and therefore the
lower the probability of survival)—this effect is negative. By adding the industry scale variable to
M2, I am controlling for the number of employees needed in the industry, which was previously
bringing the coefficients on size down. Therefore the coefficient on the number of employees has
to go up in the third model as compared to M1 and M2.
The mean experience in the industry, which is a proxy for quality, also proves to be an
interesting predictor of survival. The coefficient is always really significant and positive. The
coefficient on experience does not fluctuate much across models, suggesting that its effects on
survival are somehow independent from other predictors. However, we do notice that the
26
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Hannan and Carrol (1992) asserts that competition increases mortality.
See Pointevin (1989), Zingales (1998).
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coefficients go up from one year to the next, suggesting that experience becomes increasingly
important for survival. As previously assumed, the quadratic variable for experience reports a
consistently small negative coefficient indicating that relevant experience have a slight marginal
decreasing return on survival.
Table 1.5
Regressions of Survival in 2005 using 2004 Control Variables
Models
Control Variables in2004
Total number of employees
Relevance of experience
Quadratic of the relevance
of experience
Leverage between 0 and 1

M1
Probability
of survival
in year
2005

M2
Probability
of survival
in year
2005

M3
Probability
of survival
in year
2005

0.026
(2.39)**
0.033
(3.56)***
-0.001
(2.88)***
_

0.023
(2.10)**
0.031
(3.27)***
-0.001
(2.60)***
0.169
(1.96)*
0.029
(0.31)
-0.167
(1.64)
-0.203
(2.14)**
_

0.028
(2.50)**
0.029
(3.06)***
-0.001
(2.48)**
0.171
(1.98)**
0.035
(0.36)
-0.165
(1.62)
-0.2
(2.10)**
1.847
(2.85)***
-0.21
(0.37)
4582

Leverage equal to 1

_

Leverage greater than 1

_

Leverage is infinite

_

Portion in the industry with
fewer than 20 employees
Constant

_

1.379
1.399
(22.97)*** (18.67)***
4582
4582
Observations
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Adding leverage dummies to the regression consistently bring the coefficients on size
down. Thus, size must be accounting for a portion of the contribution of leverage on survival,
which confirms the important role of financial structure on survival.
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As previously stated, some studies28 found that the hazard of exit was augmented by debt
and hence debt had a negative effect on survival. The M2 model output reaffirms the results
found in Huynh et al. (2008) and (2009). The coefficients associated to leverage with more debt
than asset are negative and the larger the difference, the more negative the coefficients become
(the coefficients on infinite leverage are more negative than the coefficients on leverage greater
than 1). Therefore more debt increases the incentive to walk away and close the company as
opposed to finance growth (the second hypothesis is stronger than the first one).
During the first year of activity, survival probability is increased when assets are financed
with debt and equity. A debt amount below the assets value means that the owners have some
positive equity in the company and therefore have an incentive to put more efforts into running
the company, which in turn increases the probability of survival. In this scenario the positive
effect dominates. The incentive to walk away from the debt is low because of the positive equity.
The coefficient on leverage between 0 and 1 is only significant in the first year. The negative
effects associated with the coefficients on infinite leverage are significant for 2005 and 2006 and
increase from one year to the next. The increase suggests that if the firm has not financed some
assets with the debt it owes by the second year, its exit probability is increased, confirming the
second hypothesis regarding the effects of debt (walking away from it). Leverage significance
disappears as the firms enter their third year (I explain below that only initial effects are still
significant by then). Current leverage becomes an insignificant predictor of survival as the firm
becomes older. Checking the validity of both theories as the cohort ages will be possible as more
data waves are released. Note that when running linear regressions with size as the dependant
variable, I find that the more balanced the leverage is (leverage = 1), the larger the firm (see
Appendix 1.3).
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Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Huynh et al. (2008) and (2009), Huynh et al. (2009).
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Table 1.6
Regressions of Survival in 2006 using 2005 Control Variables
Models
Control Variables in 2005
Total number of employees
Relevance of experience
Quadratic of the relevance
of experience
Leverage between 0 and 1

M1
Probability
of survival
in year
2006

M2
Probability
of survival
in year
2006

M3
Probability
of survival
in year
2006

0.029
(3.20)***
0.034
(3.43)***
-0.001
(2.65)***
_

0.027
(2.94)***
0.034
(3.35)***
-0.001
(2.58)***
0.097
(1.19)
0.066
(0.61)
-0.071
(0.59)
-0.264
(2.22)**
_

0.028
(3.02)***
0.033
(3.27)***
-0.001
(2.52)**
0.099
(1.22)
0.069
(0.64)
-0.069
(0.57)
-0.264
(2.22)**
0.616
(0.82)
0.694
(1.05)
3664

Leverage equal to 1

_

Leverage greater than 1

_

Leverage is infinite

_

Portion in the industry with
fewer than 20 employees
Constant

_

1.233
1.234
(19.16)*** (16.35)***
3664
3664
Observations
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

The M3 model shows that entering a smaller scale industry increases the probability of
survival. Assuming that lower scale industries are less concentrated because of lower barriers of
entry, this finding contradicts the common belief29 that competition increases exit rates. However,
these negative effects are active as the density within the industry is increasing and the market
becomes crowded with firms. Hence, it could be that the markets are not crowded yet as the firms
enter their respective low scale industry. Not surprisingly, the industry scale variable is only
significant the first year, confirming Geroski et al. (2010) that found that the effects of industry
29

See Hannan and Carrol (1992).

30

concentration at entrance disappear after the first year. Once a firm enters an industry, this
decision cannot be reversed. The effects are therefore only visible on the first year and in the
founding conditions. Thus it is the industry entrance choice that is significant and the current
activity in a specific industry. According to the “trial by fire” hypothesis, a firm entering a highly
concentrated market and surviving the first year has more chances to survive and prosper in the
future. Only the firms with the financial capacities (deep pocket theory) should adventure
themselves in a higher scale industry for the prospects of higher potential price-cost margins.
However, the higher scale industry (percentage of firms in the two digit SIC code industry with
more than 20 employees) is associated with a negative effect on survival, which raises the
question: why would a firm with low financial capacities choose to enter a high scale industry? I
suggest a possible intuitive explanation. A higher scale industry requires heavy investments and
higher sunk costs as compared to a smaller scale industry. However, the border line is not
perceivable (in my definition the marginal employee puts the firm into the higher scale) and firms
enter a higher scale industry because of expectations of higher revenues (higher price-cost
margin). Pre-entrance, the firm has expectations on costs and revenues. However, those
expectations are prone to noise. Once a firm enters, the noise is reduced as time passes and the
firm learns about the financial burden associated with higher cost forced by the scale and lower
revenues due to the incumbents’ market power. When the noise is eliminated, and the firm
realizes the true requirements associated with operating in a higher scale industry, it decides to
continue its operation(s) or exit. Firms commit the mistake of entering a higher scale industry
because they perceive a “mid-scale industry” between the smaller and higher scale. This “midscale” is believed easier to reach than the higher scale, and is expected to provide the firm with
higher revenues. Hence the firm commits the mistake to enter and exits later.
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Table 1.7
Regressions of Survival in 2007 using 2006 Control Variables
Models

M1

M2

M3

Quadratic of the relevance
of experience
Leverage between 0 and 1

Probability
of survival
in year
2007
0.029
(3.39)***
0.037
(3.60)***
-0.001
(2.86)***
_

Leverage equal to 1

_

Leverage greater than 1

_

Leverage is infinite

_

Portion in the industry with
fewer than 20 employees
Constant

_

Probability
of survival
in year
2007
0.026
(3.08)***
0.036
(3.52)***
-0.001
(2.79)***
0.061
(0.75)
0.097
(0.88)
-0.114
(0.94)
-0.165
(1.3)
_

Probability
of survival
in year
2007
0.026
(3.01)***
0.036
(3.52)***
-0.001
(2.80)***
0.06
(0.74)
0.097
(0.88)
-0.114
(0.94)
-0.165
(1.3)
-0.181
(0.24)
1.254
(1.92)*
3092

Control Variables in 2006
Total number of employees
Relevance of experience

1.093
1.095
(16.24)*** (14.06)***
Observations
3092
3092
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

•

Effects of founding conditions on survival in the following periods
As previously suggested by Mata et al. (1995) Tables 1.8 and 1.9 show that initial size

has persisting positive effects on survival later in the life of the firm. Initial size carries minimal
decrease in coefficients in the years following birth. I find that the coefficients on initial size are
below those found in Tables 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7, hinting to size in the current year being more
important for survival than founding size, echoing the results found in Mata et al. (1995).
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Table 1.8
Regressions of Survival in 2006 using 2004 Control Variables
Models

M1

M2

M3

Probability
of survival
in year
2006
0.02
(2.72)***
0.033
(4.48)***
-0.001
(3.43)***
_

Leverage equal to 1

_

Leverage greater than 1

_

Leverage is infinite

_

Portion in the industry with
fewer than 20 employees
Constant

_

Probability
of survival
in year
2006
0.017
(2.21)**
0.032
(4.29)***
-0.001
(3.26)***
0.036
(0.55)
0.094
(1.22)
-0.179
(2.16)**
-0.249
(3.23)***
_

0.948
(19.64)***

0.988
(16.43)***

Probability
of survival
in year
2006
0.02
(2.65)***
0.031
(4.04)***
-0.001
(3.09)***
0.039
(0.6)
0.101
(1.31)
-0.175
(2.11)**
-0.245
(3.17)***
1.668
(3.21)***
-0.466
(1.02)

4582

4582

4582

Control Variables in 2004
Total number of employees
Relevance of experience
Quadratic of the relevance
of experience
Leverage between 0 and 1

Observations

Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Experience has similar coefficients for current and founding conditions. Geroski et al.
(2010) suggested that the most valuable experience is the founding experience but my results
report a slightly larger coefficient on experience for current conditions. That said, coefficients on
relevant experience are not statistically different in the 95 percent confidence interval. Hence,
despite the non-negligible contribution made by initial experience, current experience remains an
important contributor to survival. I believe that this is a result of the correlation between current
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experience and founding experience. Thinking of experience as a stock of human capital, it is
increasing (the human capital stock is building upon the initial stock) as the firm ages.
The coefficients associated with founding leverage dummies are significant in the cases
with negative equity (debt is greater than assets). Firms with initial leverage greater than 1 or with
an infinite leverage saw their probability of survival greatly diminished. A firm that starts
operation with negative equity sees its likelihood of exit soar. This is true in 2006 and 2007. The
coefficients on infinite leverage are decreasing in magnitude from 2006 and 2007 while the
coefficients for leverage greater than 1 are increasing. The loss in significance associated with the
infinite leverage coefficient can be justified with the following intuition. An infinite leverage at
foundation is most likely going to force an exit in the first years of activity and thus less firms in
the cohort as subject to its effects. To summarize, having negative equity at start up diminishes
greatly a firm’s probability of survival during the first years of activity. The industry scale
variable points to an interesting clue on the effects of industry scale on debt. It seems that
entering a smaller scale industry reduces the negative effects brought by debt on survival. The
coefficients associated with negative equity and infinite leverage are decreasing in magnitude
once small industry scale is controlled for. This could be explained with the following intuition.
The individuals entering a low scale industry most likely have to put their own assets as collateral
(such as home). Therefore walking away from the debt is harder and efforts and time will be
invested by owners, hence increasing the survival probability.
Entering a small industry scale at foundation is an important and significant predictor of
survival. The choice of operating industry is made at the firm’s entrance and thus the coefficients
and foundation are positive and significant in both 2006 and 2007. Tables 1.8 and 1.9 also report
that the positive effect associated with entering a lower scale industry is decreasing as the firm
ages (from 1.668 in 2006 to 1.003 in 2007).This could be the result of an entrance into a low
density industry that becomes more crowded as the firm ages consequently the positive effects
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disappear to give place to—maybe—negative effects in the future. More data waves would help
estimate how long the effects associated with an industry entrance remain a significant predictor
of survival.
Table 1.9
Regressions of Survival in 2007 using 2004 Control Variables
Models

M1

M2

M3

Probability
of Survival
in year
2007
0.019
(3.07)***
0.036
(5.48)***
-0.001
(4.15)***
_

Probability
of Survival
in year
2007
0.02
(3.07)***
0.033
(4.96)***
-0.001
(3.79)***
0.025
(0.45)
0.013
(0.2)
-0.262
(3.57)***
-0.197
(2.80)***
1.003
(2.16)**
-0.21
(0.52)
4582

Leverage equal to 1

_

Leverage greater than 1

_

Leverage is infinite

_

Portion in the industry with
fewer than 20 employees
Constant

_

Probability
of Survival
in year
2007
0.017
(2.76)***
0.034
(5.12)***
-0.001
(3.88)***
0.025
(0.43)
0.01
(0.15)
-0.265
(3.60)***
-0.2
(2.85)***
_

0.604
(13.99)***
4582

0.665
(12.46)***
4582

Control Variables in 2004
Total number of employees
Relevance of experience
Quadratic of the relevance
of experience
Leverage between 0 and 1

Observations

Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

1.5 Conclusion
This paper is to be considered as an introductory study to firm dynamics using the
Kauffman Firm Survey. My intention is to provide a starting point and a global perspective—
using the KFS—on the effects of founding and current firm’s conditions on its survival. Scholars
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have already covered a broad range of subjects regarding the factors prone to increase the
probability of survival. Many theories followed by empirical evidence assert that size and
relevant experience are positive predictors of a firm’s survival in both current and founding
conditions. However, other dimensions specific to a firm’s financial and environmental
conditions are more obscure. The effects of leverage and industry’s concentration are less
evident. The available data had always been lacking financial information on a broader range of
industries which is why most financial research on firm dynamics was directed toward
manufacturing and high-tech industries. Research has also claimed the non negligible and even
important effects of founding conditions on survivability in the future periods. The release of the
KFS allows me to conduct a more suitable study on the effects of leverage and industry scale in
the current and founding conditions. I run three different probit models on survival using both
current and founding conditions.
The results reaffirm the importance of size in both current and founding regressions with
current size being more important than startup size. First, a bigger size in the current state allows
the firm to be operating closer to the MES and hence be more efficient. Second, the bigger a firm
is the more room it has to downgrade when needed. This last theoretical advantage is also true for
the founding size. Moreover, bigger size at startup sends a positive signal to lenders.
I find that relevant experience is a significant positive predictor of survival and is prone
to diminishing returns. Like Thompson (2005), the regressions report that the importance of
relevant experience does not decay.
The probability of survival is decreasing with leverage and it seems that debt—when not
justified by acquiring assets—is a negative contributor to survival. The more debt the company
has at startup the more likely the exit with effects decaying as the company matures. When the
firm has negative equity, the probability of exit is found to be greater in both current and
founding conditions regressions.
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The effects of industry scale are significant only for industry entrance as opposed to
yearly activity within the industry. The result that causes concern is the positive effects associated
with entrance into a small scale industry. This goes against the generally accepted proposition
that competition increases the probability of exit but can be justified by low density within the
industry at time of entrance. Besides, Åstebro and Bernhardt (2003) find similar results.
Moreover, the regressions results on M3 brings up a new proposition—entrance in a small scale
industry reduces the negative effects of debt (more realistically of negative equity).
As more waves and data become available, more questions can be answered which opens
the door to future research possibilities. For example, can we estimate the time frame before
founding conditions’ effects on survival become insignificant or what is the link between industry
concentration and firms’ survival?
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CHAPTER 2
Firms’ Survival within the Product-Service Spectrum using the KFS: How the
Choice between Product or Service Influences Survival.
2.1 Introduction
Services are a large and growing part of gross domestic product (GDP) (see Figure 2.1).
Some scholars 30 believe that because service industries are labor intensive and exhibit little
productivity growth, the increasing share of GDP could result in lower economic growth.
However, the emergence of new technologies contradicts this belief as they have played an
important role, in that services have actually spread to many areas because of them (the Internet,
smart phones, etc.). In addition, some studies 31 suggest that the growth associated to goods’
productivity is partly the result of growth in the service sector. The literature has treated services
fairly as non-tradable as opposed to goods that are highly tradable. Therefore the trade was highly
dominated by good-providing firms, while service-providing firms were limited to the domestic
market. With the emergence of the Internet 32 , SPs have seen their market grow and hence
potential increase in revenues. Granted, not all services have become tradable, but firms can now
consult, advise and diagnose online in exchange for payment. Furthermore, the development of
new marketing strategies together with the evolution of technology has created an increasing
amount of online firms providing services and being able to survive and even thrive.
Bhattacherjee (2001) discusses the effects of implementing a customer relationship
management (CRM) program into e-commerce businesses and shows how beneficial this can be
as it moves the business focus towards customer retention. Obviously, this technology explosion
has contributed a lot to the growth of the service branch, but it is not the only reason that more

30

Baumol (1967) and Baumol, Blackman and Wolff (1985).

31

Raa and Wolff (1996).

32

Freund and Weinhold (2002) found that the Internet contributed to a growth in service trade.
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firms are becoming service providers (SPs) or initially start out as SPs. Abraham and Taylor
(1996) found that firms contract service providers in order to smooth production cycles and save
on labor costs, allowing both companies to increase profits by lowering costs. Other possible
explanations for the increase in SPs could be linked to the change in the labor force composition.
For instance, the increase in labor supplied by women33 as well as in female entrepreneurship34
has contributed to the increase in SPs. Indeed, women are now overrepresented in the retail and
service industries35. Another possibility is linked to new estimates in the literature that suggest
that services may be income-inelastic36, allowing for greater customer retention. Entry rates may
therefore have been higher for service providers, or they may be exiting at a slower pace. It could
also be that more product provider firms are becoming service providers than vice versa. The
likely explanation is a combination of all of the above.
Firms’ survival has been covered extensively in the literature. Scholars have extensively
researched the variables that contribute to survival in the hope of benefiting firms’ future
planning. The majority of determinants for survival studied so far fall into two distinct categories:
firm37 or industry 38 specific variables. I am studying a new dimension that falls into the firm
specific variable classification. Firms must also choose whether they are service providers (SPs),
product providers (PPs) or providers of both service(s) and product(s) (PBs).

33

Oppenheimer (1970).

34

Kalleberg and Leicht (1991).

35

Watson (2003).

36

Falvey and Gemmell (1996).

37

Size, experience, education, owners’ profile, financial profile (assets, debt, debt-equity ratio, etc.) are
very common variables in the literature. Klepper and Simons (2000), Thompson (2005), Geroski, Mata,
Portugal (2010), Mata and Portugal (1994), Huynh, Petrunia and Voia, (2010) are empirical papers. Cooley
and Quadrini (2001) is a reference at the financial theoretical level.
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Audretsch (1991) inspect the effects of industry specific variables on firms’ survival. Audretsch and
Mahmood (1994) and Åstebro and Bernhardt (2003) add firm specific variables to industry specific
variables.
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Insofar as known, the study of firms’ survival from the product-service spectrum has not
been done. This paper represents an initial step towards understanding the consequences of this
survival choice. Thus, the main motivation for this paper is to find evidence that the decision to
be an SP or a PP significantly contributes to a firm’s survival. I put forward the possibility that
SPs are more likely to survive than PPs. Furthermore, there is also the possibility of providing
both service(s) and product(s), which, according to Cohen and Whang (1997), is more
advantageous. For example, if a firm offers extended warranties39 or maintenance to a consumer
that purchases a new product, the firm is providing both a product and service. A maintenance
program is seen as a long-term commitment from the consumer and a stream of revenue to the
providing firm. Although it would be very interesting to study cases of providing both services
and products, this paper will abstain from that in order to simplify the analysis.
Figure 2.1
Services as a Percentage of GDP in the U.S.

Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.
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Priest (2007) explains that there are two branches in the literature that adopt different views regarding
extended warranties offered by manufacturers. The first, and oldest, sees warranties as contracts in which
manufacturers limit their obligations and is a negative point to the consumer. The second branch explains
that consumers can use warranties as a signaling device in order to evaluate product reliability. Thus, the
first theory could be a possible contributor to PBs’ and SPs’ survival.
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I used the Kauffman Firm Survey, in which firms are asked whether they are providing a
product, a service or both. Using a Cox proportional hazard model, I found that hazard increases
when firms are good(s) providers as opposed to service(s) providers. I tested six hypotheses that
could explain the causes of this hazard rate behavior. I allowed coefficients to differ depending on
whether the firm was an SP, PP or PB. Although none of my stated hypotheses explain SPs’
higher survival capabilities, I reviewed some studies suggesting (without testing because of a lack
of data) that SPs’ higher probability to evade taxes40 together with social psychology linked with
human bonding and customer satisfaction could be the answer to SPs’ higher survival ability, as a
result of increased customer retention. For instance, mechanics rely on the confidence and trust
their customers have in them. Bolton (1998) analyses SPs customer relations and suggests that
customer satisfaction is important for customer retention.
The first section of the paper describes the Kauffman Firm Survey and provides summary
statistics on the full data set. The second section describes the model used in the analysis.
Hypotheses that could explain the possible causes of SPs’ higher potential for survival when
compared to PPs are introduced along with a literature review. The third section presents the
results together with a little discussion of providers of both service(s) and product(s). Finally, I
conclude the paper with a summary of the findings and a discussion for future research
possibilities.
2.2 The Data

•

The Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS)
I use the public release of the KFS, a panel data set covering a broad range of topics,

allowing the study of a sample of firms created in 2004. The data set contains information on a

40

Murray (1997) states:” Some retail firms, especially those with high value added (such as service
providers), may choose not to register at all (for sales tax), in turn simply paying sales tax on their inputs.”
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variety of topics, including financing, organizational structure and legal status, business
characteristics and strategy, owner demographics and work behavior.
The KFS is taken from a random sample of businesses—from the Dun and Bradstreet
(DB) database—created in 2004. The questionnaires sent to the sample were designed by the
Mathematica Policy Research. The baseline questionnaire was sent in 2004, and because of the
quest for a longitudinal database, follow-up questionnaires were sent every following year. So far,
four follow-up waves consisting of 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 data have been added.
The development and change aspects involved with innovations in high-tech industries
motivated the Foundation to oversample firms in these fields.
The screening/eligibility test allowed only 15 percent of the potential pool of firms to be
part of the sample. The initial sample of firms passed “the eligibility test” defining a new business
in 2004 and consisted of 4,928 firms out of an initial pool of 32,429 businesses. Respondents
were paid $50 to answer questions using a self-administered Web survey or a computer-assisted
telephone interview. Eligibility was determined with two tests. A firm had to be a new company,
and it had to be created individually by de novo entrepreneurs. The first test ensures that the
company had started its activity in 2004. Therefore, if the firm had started activity in 2003 (or
earlier) under any other form of structure, and the 2004 initial year of activity, for example, only
marked a restructuring (e.g., sold business, renamed business, or changed activity), the firm did
not qualify to be part of the sample. The second test checked ownership and provenance of the
firm. It could not be a subsidiary of any other business, could not have been a spin off, nor
inherited by previous owners. Finally, it could not be a not-for-profit company. Firms that passed
both tests were part of the sample in the baseline questionnaire and follow-ups. As previously
stated, there are five waves available in the current KFS. Firms that participated in the first wave
satisfied two conditions. They first needed to be part of the baseline sample and to have survived
the first year of activity.
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The possible reasons for exit were determined at the beginning of the survey. Firms that
ceased operation temporarily were a small minority in the sample. I exclude these firms from the
study because the survey extends five years. A firm that ceased operation temporarily (for
example one that exits in 2005 and is seen to reappear in 2008) is dropped from the sample.
Table 2.1
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Firms’ Outcomes (2004-2008) in Percentages
Year

2005

2006

2007

2008

Survived

92.3

84.2

74.6

67.6

Closed operations

5.3

11.7

19.8

26.6

Sold to or merged with another business

1.2

2.8

3.9

4.8

Temporarily ceased operations or other

1.2

1.3

1.8

1.1

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

TOTAL

Source: Kauffman Firm Survey Microdata. Sample includes only surviving firms over the
2004-2007 period, and firms that have been verified as going out of business over the same
period. The original sample size in 2004 was 4,928.

Within this study, any reason that causes the respondents to declare that the original
business is no longer in operation under at least one of the original founders is defined as
inactive 42 (46 observations were removed because the businesses in question either changed
ownership or temporarily stopped operations). Businesses that were sold or that merged with
other businesses were also described as closed because of this change in ownership. The data
show that 4.8 percent of starting firms were sold by the end of 2008. Some of the surviving firms
chose not to answer further questions, and sample weights were adjusted accordingly. A firm
described as active in a given year had to have been described as active in all previous years.

41

From Robb et al. (2010)“An overview of the Kauffman Firm Survey”, Results from the 2004-2008
Data”.
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Failure is defined differently between various studies. Hall (1987) considers mergers to be the exit of two
firms into the creation of a new firm. The creation of a new firm is irrelevant to my study.

46

Table 2.2
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Firms’ Distribution by Industry in Percentages
KFS New
Employer
Businesses

Census
Employer
Firm
Births

PSED
New
Businesses

Professional (54), Management, and
Educational Services (61)

16.1

14.1

16.8

Retail Trade (44)

15.6

12.0

18.6

Administrative and Support, and Waste
Management and Remediation Services (56)

11.4

6.0

2.1

Construction (23)

9.8

15.7

10.0

Other Services (except Public Administration)
(81)

8.0

8.5

0.3

Manufacturing (31)

7.2

3.2

3.5

Wholesale Trade (42)

6.0

4.5

1.5

Real Estate, Rental and Leasing (53)

3.7

5.1

5.3

Finance and Insurance (52)

4.7

2.2

3.1

Health Care and Social Assistance (62)

4.2

7.7

2.9

Information (51)

2.6

1.4

4.2

Transportation and Warehousing (48)

2.9

3.3

2.4

Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation (71)

3.1

2.1

3.2

Accommodation and Food Services (72)

3.9

9.1

10.9

Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and hunting
(11)

1.4

0.4

2.0

Mining (21)

0.0

0.3

0.5

Utilities (22)

0.0

0.1

0.5

Management of Companies and Enterprises
(55)

0.0

0.1

6.7

Unclassified (99)

0.0

2.2

5.6

Industry Names and (Code)

Source: Kauffman Firm Survey, Baseline data: Tabulations by Mathematica Policy Research,
Inc; and Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, from longitudinal data
(established with some first-quarter payroll) provided by the U.S. Census Bureau; Reynolds, P.
2004. Entrepreneurship in the United States Assessment, Miami, Fla: Florida International
University.
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From Robb et al. (2010) “An overview of the Kauffman Firm Survey”, Results from the 2004-2007
Data”.
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Some firms surveyed may also be firms that were created to reduce an individual’s taxes.
Prior research, both theoretical and empirical (Åstebro and Bernhadt, 2003; Gordon, 1998), has
shown that paying fewer taxes could be one incentive for individuals to create companies. This is
because corporate tax rules are often advantageous compared to income tax. Some of the firms
surveyed were therefore likely to have been created as tax shelters. I chose to correct for this issue
by removing firms that reported no sales in all years of activity (47 observations were deleted).
The distribution of firms by industry shows that in comparison to the U.S Census, the KFS
has a higher proportion of businesses in multiple industries including manufacturing, professional
management, education, retail and wholesale, finance and insurance. However, the KFS has a
lower proportion of firms in construction, health care and social assistance, and accommodation
and food services (see Table 2.2).
The sample surveyed shows that the majority of firms start as small, with fewer than five
employees (75.1 percent). Also, the distribution of firms by size shows similarities with the
Census. For example, 10.35 percent of the KFS sample startup with ten or more employees,
compared to 10.4 percent44 in the Census. Table 2.3 shows that the KFS was not able to capture
any firm in its sample with 500 employees or more. The Foundation suggests this could be
because few firms have the capacity to begin at such a large scale.
The KFS reports a 92.3 percent survival rate in the first year of activity. This rate is
higher than those found in previous studies. For instance, the U.S. Small Business Administration
found the survival rate of single-establishment firms founded in 1997 was only 75 percent in the
first year. The CBO has found rates similar to the U.S. Small Business Administration for
different cohorts of single-establishment firms (Shane, 2008). The KFS could be registering
higher rates for a simple reason: firms created in the beginning of 2004 and closing shortly after
may have been omitted from the sample due to the screening method. Therefore, a firm that
44

Robb, Ballou, DesRoches, Potter, Zhao and Reedy (2010).
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would have closed before the baseline survey was issued in 2005 could not be part of the
sample45.
Table 2.3
Distribution of Firms by Employment Size Category46 in Percentages

Number of Employees

KFS New businesses

Census New Businesses

1-4

75.1

76.7

5-9

14.6

13.0

10-19

6.6

6.0

20-99

3.4

3.8

100-499

0.3

0.4

500+

0.0

0.047

Source: Kauffman Firm Survey, Baseline data; Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small
Business Administration, Statistics of U.S. businesses, U.S. Census, 2004.

The KFS baseline questionnaire and following waves ask whether the interviewed firm
would describe itself as a service(s) provider (SP), product(s) provider (PP) or as providing both
service(s) and product(s) (PB). Thus, each firm could only be classified in one part of the
“product-service spectrum.” Some firms chose not to answer, and I treat them as missing data in
this study. Table 2.4 shows that SPs seem to be the biggest part of the sample every year while
PPs remain a smaller part of the sample as time passes. The PBs segment seems to be the only
one not monotonically decreasing as a percentage of the sample. Indeed, they became a larger
part of the sample from 2004 to 2005 and from 2007 to 2008. It could be because some of the
firms that were only providing services or products decided to provide both.

45

Hall (1987) suggests that the sample bias created by the earlier death probability of younger firms is not a
problem in her study of growth.
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From Robb et al. (2010) “An overview of the Kauffman Firm Survey”, results from the 2004-2007 data”.
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This number rounds to 0.0. Actual number is 0.04.

49

Table 2.4
The Sample of the Surviving Population by Provider Categories in Percentages
Provider
Category
PB

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

37.4

38.4

36.1

34.5

35.0

SP

48.0

41.3

40.6

38.4

36.8

PP

14.3

11.3

10.1

9.6

9.1

Missing Data

0.3

9.0

13.3

17.5

19.1

Source: Tabulation of the Kauffman Firm Survey, 2010 release.

Between 2004 and 2005, 20.3 percent (139) of the PPs decided to provide both services
and products by 2005. For comparison, only 11.3 percent (259) of the SPs in 2004 provided both
services and products in 2005. Moreover, 14.3 percent (256) of the firms providing both services
and products in 2004 stopped providing products (became SP) and 5.8 percent (104) stopped
providing services (became PP). Also 0.6 percent (15) of SPs in 2004 became PPs in 2005 and
3.5 percent (24) of the PPs in 2004 became SPs in 2005. Overall, the statistics reflect a trend in
the firms’ desire to move away from providing products. Also, it is more likely that a firm will
move from PPs to PBs than from SPs to the PBs category. Keeping in mind that a firm’s best
strategy is whatever maximizes its profits given its skill and resources (and referring to
Jovanovic, 1982), the trend suggests a desire for firms to move into the PBs group. It may also be
harder to operate as a PP than as an SP, as it is easier to add services to your portfolio if you
already are providing a product than adding products if you are an SP, as that entails a larger sunk
cost. A closer look at the numbers shows that a large number of the PBs have a preference for
services, as they seem to continue providing services when deciding whether to provide services
or products (14.3 against 5.8 percent). Another possibility is that SPs are more likely to survive
than the PPs group. The higher failure rates associated with PPs can be seen in the representation
of the Kaplan-Meier surviving function (see Figure 2.2).
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Figure 2.2
Kaplan-Meier Survival Graph

•

Added data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
I created an industry wage variable that was built using information published in the

Monthly Labor Review by the BLS dating from March 2008. The BLS published the seasonally
adjusted average hourly earnings for some industries in 2005, 2006 and 2007. Thus, I needed to
build the data for 2004 and 2008. I proceeded by assuming a linear relationship calculating the
average growth rate from 2004 to 2005 and 2005 to 2006. This average growth was then used to
calculate an approximation of the average hourly wage by industry in 2004 and 2008. The results
can be found in Table 2.5.
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Table 2.5
Industries’ Average Wage
NAICS
11
23
31
32
33
42
44
48
22
51
52
53
54
55
56
61
71
81

Estimated
Wage 04
17.68
18.76
11.47
15.89
16.85
17.50
12.15
16.19
26.08
21.18
17.14
16.18
17.13
25.83
13.75
16.09
8.90
13.92

Wage 05

Wage 06

Wage 07

18.72
19.46
12.06
16.51
17.05
18.16
12.36
16.70
26.68
22.06
17.94
16.76
18.08
27.13
14.19
16.71
9.38
14.34

19.90
20.02
12.98
17.49
17.22
18.91
12.58
17.28
27.42
23.23
18.80
17.32
19.12
28.41
14.56
17.38
9.75
14.77

20.99
20.94
13.32
17.83
17.46
19.56
12.80
17.76
27.93
23.92
19.66
17.99
20.15
29.93
15.11
18.03
10.41
15.22

Estimated
Wage 08
22.23
21.72
14.00
18.53
17.67
20.30
13.03
18.32
28.58
24.91
20.58
18.64
21.27
31.44
15.59
18.73
10.97
15.68

2.3 The Model
•

The Cox Proportional Hazard Model: A semi-parametric specification
The most appropriate method of analysis to be used in survival analysis is unambiguously

the hazard model. I do not assume any distribution for the failure time. Subsequent to the trend
set by the literature, this paper follows a semi-parametric specification and uses the Cox
proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972). The model can be written as:

h

j

+
(
)
( t ) = h 0 (t ) e β 0 x j β x
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where

h

j

represents the hazard faced by subject j and

h

0

the baseline hazard that everyone

faces48. The subject hazard function is therefore a multiplicative of the baseline hazard adapted
through an xj vector specific to the firm j. An advantage of using the Cox model is that the
baseline hazard function does not need to be determined. The reason behind this helpful
characteristic is its cancelation when performing calculations in a binary-outcome analysis. The
disadvantage of the Cox model is that it imposes proportional hazards.
The specific model used in this study allows each independent variable within
different coefficients

to have

β whether the firm j is a service provider, a product provider or a provider

of both. Indeed, it seems logical that some variables may have different effects on the firm
whether it is a service provider, a product provider or a provider of both. So far, in the literature,
the results associated with all the variables known to be good predictors of survival were never
studied from this perspective. This study offers a new point of view on the matter49.
•

The hypotheses
There are six possible hypotheses studied in this paper for service providers to have a

higher survival probability than product providers. These potential explanatory variables were
picked from the literature because they are known to be predictors of survivability. Some of the
hypotheses also emerged because SPs and PPs differ drastically in those variables. A summary of
means can be found in Table 2.6.

48

I control for industries fixed effects and run robust regressions.

49

I ran two Wald tests with chi-squared distribution for each variable used in the analysis to determine
whether the coefficients are significantly different for SPs, PPs and PBs and if any of the variables would
have SPs and PPs coefficient jointly equal to 0. The results can be found in Appendix 2.1. The null
hypotheses are: β = β = β and β = β = 0
SP

PP

PB

SP

PP

53

Table 2.6
Variables’ Mean
SPs
Mean

PPs
Mean

PB
Mean

36,900***
(14,700)
51,204***
(1,255)
162,911***
(3,277)
13.48***
(0.126)
3.524***
(0.0601)
101,300***
(3,370)
17.06***
(0.0336)
6,267

52,200***
(3,080)
61,997***
(2,684)
232,647***
(7,661)
10.56***
(0.243)
4.290***
(0.136)
192,700***
(9,900)
15.79***
(0.0744)
1,620

49,800***
(1,940)
65,099***
(1,682)
232,637***
(4,428)
12.35***
(0.141)
4.443***
(0.0817)
174,400***
(5,420)
16.44***
(0.0466)
4,560

Variables
Capital per worker
Expenses per worker
Total expenses
Owners’ experience
Size
Total assets
Industry wage
Observations

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

An important aspect that differentiates SPs from PPs is the amount of capital used in both
segments. Product providers are more capital intensive than service providers and both Audretsch
(1991) and Audretsch and Mahmood (1994) found that capital-intensive industries tend to
increase the hazard and could be the result of the larger investments required by higher-scale
industries, which makes them harder to operate. The increase in the hazard can be
counterbalanced with a higher startup size. In my study, the total assets value represents the sum
of the firm’s total equipment, its total inventory, its real estate ownership and finally the vehicles
bought and registered under the firm’s name. In order to control for the size effect of total assets,
I divided it by the number of workers to create value of assets per worker.
H1: Capital intensity is a negative predictor of survival. Product providers, on average,
are more capital intensive than service providers. Capital intensity will explain the higher
probability of exit for a product provider.
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Differing levels of expenses are another possible explanation for the greater likelihood of
survival of service providers over product providers. As shown in Table 2.6, product providers
have higher expenses on average than service providers. Huyhebaert, Gaeremynck, Roodhooft
and Van de Gucht (2000) explain that firms with higher fixed coverage expenses are expected to
fail because banks will charge them a higher interest rate, and thus a larger part of the firm’s
funds will have to be paid to debt providers, meaning the firm has less for future investment. One
could argue that expenses could be a proxy for size and that these two variables could therefore
be highly correlated. This is a reasonable argument, and hence I created a variable that measures
expenses per worker. This variable should allow the study of expenses while controlling for the
size effect.
H2: Higher expenses per worker will increase firms’ failure rates. Product providers, on
average, have more expenses per worker than service providers. Higher expenses per worker
explain the higher probability of exit for a product provider.
Human capital is a very important predictor of survival. Together with size, it could also
be the most studied predictor of survival. Pre-entry experience relevant to the industry has also
been shown to be an important variable in survival studies. The survey reports the years of
industry-specific experience each owner had before the creation of the firm. Owners’ previous
industry experience can act as a proxy for human capital. After showing pre-entry relevant
experience to be a good proxy for a firm’s quality, Thompson (2005) affirms that relevant
experience does indeed have persistent effects on survival and that these effects do not decay over
time. Geroski et al. (2010) indirectly test the hypothesis50 that human capital is the main factor
that provides firms with an edge because it cannot be replicated by competitors. They use
education as a proxy for human capital and find that education reduces the hazard of exit. Lucas

50

Following previous research such as Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984 and Youndt, Snell, Dean and
Lepak, 1996.
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(1978) shows that having better quality human capital allows a firm to lower its cost at any given
level of production. The intuition is that the more experienced the owners are in the related
industry prior to starting the firm, the higher the probability for the firm to be of a higher quality.
I constructed the variable for the firm’s experience by calculating the mean experience brought in
by each owner. The survey has an upper bound for years of experience equal to 40 years. If the
corresponding owner has 41 or more years of experience, he or she is registered as having 40+
years of experience, bringing me to censor the years of experience variable from above and lock
it to a maximum of 40. Assuming decreasing returns to experience, censoring from above should
have little or no consequence. The argument could be made that mean owners’ relevant
experience is not the best measure of the firm’s experience. An average weighted according to the
time put in the company by each owner would be a better measure. The more an owner works in
the company, the higher the weight of his experience. Unfortunately, this method is impossible to
apply given the data.
H3: Higher owners’ experience will decrease the hazard on survival. Product providers
with a lower average experience increases the hazard rate when compared to service providers.
Industry wage is another measure positively related to survival. Audretsch and Mahmood
(1994) explain that industries with higher wages tend to express higher investment in human
capital or labor-related sunk costs. Thus, industry wage proxies for human capital in the industry
in which the firm operates. Product providers have, on average, smaller industry wages and
higher industry wage is likely to be a positive predictor of survival, as demonstrated in Audretsch
and Mahmood (1994). Thus product providers could be at a disadvantage compared to service
providers.
H4: Industry wage will decrease the hazard rate. Product providers with a lower average
wage are disadvantaged when compared to service providers.
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As mentioned, the “total assets” 51 variable is the sum of four variables found in the
Kauffman Firm Survey. Those variables are range variables. Operations are not possible on range
variables, so I have used the ranges’ midpoints as a point of reference (I did not have access to the
ranges’ means and medians). The use of midpoints to proxy for the range values has been used in
previous research, 52 including some working papers using the KFS, 53 and is accepted as an
admissible replacement for the real values.
Asset values are book values and therefore subject to depreciation. Asset value could be
used as a proxy for size, and therefore, tone might expect total assets to react as a variable in the
same way as size. However, the new findings are expressed in the results. Allowing for different
slopes for SPs, PPs and PBs allows a determination of whether asset size could actually play a
negative role in survival, depending on firms’ activities. As far as I am aware, there has been no
previous research on this aspect.
So far, researchers have reported a general positive effect of size (and thus assets) on
survival (Geroski et al, 2010; Mata and Portugal, 1994). One possible reason is that the higher the
asset stock at creation, the more positive the message sent to debt institutions and therefore, the
more access a firm has to debt to finance its growth. However, the fewer assets tied to the
business, the more opportunities the firm has to readjust its products and services. Moreover, a
firm’s assets are subject to depreciation, which is incurred as a cost. As such, I believe that once
size is controlled for in H6 (assuming it to be positive on survival), the real effect of total assets
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The survey classifies financial information under range variables.

52

Kennickell (1998) suggests that the range variables reported in the Survey of Consumer Finances are a
limitation to research and thus suggests in Kennickell (1999) that the midpoints of the respective ranges are
used.
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The working paper by Braymen and Neymotin entitled “Immigrant enclaves and the success of
entrepreneurial ventures” (2011) assigned midpoints to the range variables whenever the respondent was
asked to choose a range in the KFS. Robb and Coleman’s working paper entitled “The impact of financial
capital on business performance: a comparison of women- and men-owned firms” (2009) used a similar
approach.
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should increase the hazard rate and therefore have a negative effect on survival. Referring to
Table 2.6, note that product providers have more assets on average than service providers.
H5: Total assets should decrease firms’ failure rates. However, once size is controlled
for, total assets will increase the firms’ hazard rates. Product providers with higher average
assets value will be more likely to exit than service providers.
Some studies have been conducted on the determinants of growth over time, while others
have focused on the initial starting size (Audretsh and Mahmood, 1994; Dunne, Roberts and
Samuelson, 1989; Geroski et al., 2010; Haverman, 1995; Mata and Portugal, 1994; Mitchell,
1994; Sharma and Kesner, 1996). A simple reason for the higher failure rate of smaller firms is
that larger firms have the option to downsize when needed (cut expenses). Moreover, in difficult
times, larger firms can withdraw from dying markets and refocus on more viable options. The
possibility to withdraw from markets is more difficult for smaller firms because of the smaller
scope of their operations. Others 54 have suggested that larger firms are less susceptible to
financial constraints and therefore have access to funds to weather difficult times or even to
finance projects. An interesting alternative explanation deals with the costs of production. There
are lower per unit costs associated with producing on a large scale (Lucas, 1978). The bigger a
firm is, the closer to the minimum efficient scale (MES) of production it is and the lower its costs
of production. The lower costs associated with the MES theory could happen for two reasons.
First, a larger size allows the firm to operate further down the cost curve. The second reason is
that fewer financial constraints allow the firm to operate at a higher scale. Geroski et al. (2010)
also report a non-instantaneous increase in survival prospects as a firm’s size increases, which is
partly consistent with Jovanovic (1982) who states that firms adjust their size (by learning about
their efficiency as time goes by) according to past performance, and only current size matters in
54

Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) was a pioneer paper that asked the cash flow effect on investment
question. Zingales (1998), like Fazzari et al. (1998), study the effect of capital market imperfections on
survival. They find that highly leveraged firms are less likely to survive.
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predicting survivability. Another interesting possibility is that entering larger in size sends a
positive signal and relaxes liquidity constraints proposed by Evans and Jovanovic (1989). On
average, product providers are bigger than service providers. I built a size variable using the total
number of employees including operating owners.
H6: Size as expressed in numbers of employees will decrease the hazard rate. Product
providers are larger on average, and therefore do not explain why product providers have a
lower survival likelihood.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
I first ran a basic regression that showed being a PP increased the hazard rate by 35.5
percent (exp (0.304) = 1.3552) compared to an SP (variable omitted from the regression). The
results are reported in Table 2.7. I ran two types of regressions. The first helped me understand
whether one hypothesis alone was responsible for the results found in the base model.
Subsequently, I ran a second set of regressions adding one variable at a time to each previous
model. I had six hypotheses, and therefore each set of regression had six models on top of the
base model. The different Wald tests (chi-squared distribution) rejected the null hypothesis 55
except those run on expenses per worker, owner’s experience and the industry wage variable56.
Therefore all variables beside these three variables are allowed to have different s for service
providers, product providers, and providers of both.
•

Survival analysis—testing one hypothesis at a time
The variable PP is always significant, no matter which explanatory variable is used in the

Model. This consistent significance on PP points to the fact that none of the hypotheses alone can
explain the higher probability of product providers exiting when compared to service providers.
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The null hypothesis states that all three groups’ coefficients are equal for each variable in the vector x.
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The results are reported in Appendix2.1.
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Although I cannot come to any conclusion using these results, I can however examine how each
variable influences PPs’ and SPs’ survival.
Table 2.7
Individual Regressions
VARIABLES
PP
PB
SP capital per
Worker
PP capital per
Worker
PB capital per
Worker
Expenses per
Worker
Owners’
Experience
Industry wage

Base
Model
0.304**
(0.105)
-0.128*
(0.0774)

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

0.341**
(0.117)
-0.107
(0.0843)
-0.0799
(0.0510)
-0.228**
(0.111)
-0.0746
(0.0621)

0.292***
(0.108)
-0.105
(0.0791)

0.273**
(0.107)
-0.136*
(0.0787)

0.303**
(0.105)
-0.129*
(0.0774

0.293**
(0.117)
-0.0844
(0.0843)

0.220*
(0.133)
-0.226**
(0.104)

-0.0171***
(0.00498)
-0.0164***
(0.00387)
-0.106
(0.0980

SP assets

-0.0559**
(0.0249)
-0.0613*
(0.0338)
-0.0658***
(0.0222)

PP assets
PB assets
SP size
PP size
PB size
Observations
14,881
13,887
Robust standard errors in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

14,164

14,335

14,873

14,170

-0.0802***
(0.0191)
-0.0480**
(0.0217)
-0.0373***
(0.0134)
14,621

First, the only significant coefficient found in the first model is the one associated with
PP’s capital per worker despite the signs on all coefficients confirming a decrease in the hazard
rate with an increase in capital per worker and thus rejecting hypothesis 1. It seems that capital
per worker only plays a significant role when the firm is a product provider. The second model,
which tests expenses per worker, returns a significant negative coefficient as well, and H2 is also
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rejected. The third model supports H3, and the coefficient is highly significant proving again that
owner’s experience is an important contributor to a firm’s survival. The fourth model returns an
insignificant coefficient57 with a sign confirming the literature58 hence supporting the hypothesis
4. Moreover, in the fifth model, PPs benefit more from an increase in assets 59 (although this
model does not control for size). The coefficients in Model 6 are significant, but the magnitude
comparison between SPs and PPs is rather surprising. The coefficients on size seem to indicate a
higher marginal contribution toward survival for service providers. Overall, H3 and H6 are
supported while H5 is not relevant because I do not control for size in the fifth model.
•

Survival analysis with developed model
Table 2.8 shows the results for this analysis. The first model adds capital per worker to

the base model. The PP coefficient is still highly significant, and the hazard magnitude went up,
which means that capital per worker is actually a positive predictor of survival for PP and
provides an advantage to PPs as compared to SPs (note that the increase in PP coefficients from
the base model to Model 1 is lower than the standard errors). Therefore I can reject the hypothesis
1. The significant coefficient found for “PP capital per worker” tells the same story. In the base
model, capital per worker was embedded within the model and kept the PP hazard coefficient
down. When capital per worker is controlled for, the coefficient on PP goes up. Although capital
per worker is always beneficial to survival, this variable proves to be a more important
contributor to survival for PPs (a higher coefficient than SPs in absolute value). Table 2.6 shows
that PPs have higher capital per worker on average. An increase of $100,000 reduces the hazard
by only 7.7 percent (exp (-0.0799) = 0.9232) for SPs when it reduces the hazard by 20.39 percent

57

This confirms the result found in Appendix 2.1 for industry wage.
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See Audretsch and Mahmood (1994).
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According to Baumol (1967) and Baumol et al. (1985), service providers are labor intensive as opposed
to good providers that are capital intensive.
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(exp (-0.228) = 0.7961) for PPs. This clearly shows the importance of capital per worker for
product providers.
The second model adds expenses per worker to the first model. The coefficient on PP
remains significant. The model clearly rejects H2, and higher expenses per worker reduce failure
probability. An increase of $100,000 in expense per worker decreases the exit probability by a
little more than 1.5 percent (exp (-0.0159) = 0.9842), and the coefficient on expenses per worker
is significant.
Owners’ experience is added in the third model and the coefficient on PP is still
significant. Each additional year of experience reduces the hazard by only 1.55 percent (exp (0.0156) = 0.9845) for all three groups. The coefficient on PP has gone down in the third model
(decrease is lower than the standard errors), which is in concordance with the means reported in
Table 2.6 where we can see that SPs are, on average, more experienced than product providers.
Hence, the effects of owners’ experience increased the hazard on PP when it was not controlled
for. Experience is clearly a contributor to SPs higher survival probability, but the difference in
coefficients between the second model and the third model suggests it is not the main predictor I
was looking for. Thus, H3 is partly supported.
Industry wage is added in the fourth model and has no effect on the PP coefficient.
Industry wage is a proxy for experience. The higher the industry wage, the more likely firms have
invested in human capital formation—training, management, higher percentage of white collar
jobs. The coefficient associated with industry wage is insignificant, although its economic effect
seems to be confirming the literature 60 , namely a positive predictor of survival. Thus, I can
neither reject nor support the hypothesis 4.
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See Audretsch and Mahmood (1994).
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Model 5 adds total assets and the results confirm the first part of H5; namely, the
coefficients associated with the different assets groups are indeed negative (the coefficient on PP
is statistically insignificant) and thus total assets stock decreases the firms’ failure rate when size
is not controlled.
Size is added in the last model making Model 6 the most complete model. As expected,
the coefficients on total assets are now positive for both SPs and PPs (and statistically significant
for PPs), while the coefficients on size are now negative. Thus, once size is controlled for, total
assets value does indeed increase the firms’ failure rates while size decreases them, confirming
the second part of the hypothesis 5. Once I control for the positive effect of size, total assets
increase the hazard rate. More assets mean higher sunk costs. On the one hand, this can be
interpreted as a reduction in the available capital, resulting in a firm limiting its ability to finance
future growth. On the other hand, higher sunk costs are often wrongly interpreted as being tied up
in a business by entrepreneurs, who therefore seek to prolong the firm’s life. The entrepreneurs’
desire to prolong the firm’s life due to higher sunk costs is referred as the “sunk cost effect”61 in
the literature. The model thus points to the first effect being more significant than the second. The
coefficient on PPs, when compared to SPs, indicates that the total assets figure is a larger (and
more significant) contributor to PPs’ failure rates—PPs’ total assets are on average larger than
service providers.
My results confirmed previous findings62, specifically the significant positive relationship
existing between a firm’s size and its survival. A marginal employee increases SPs’ survival
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In their paper, Arkes and Ayton (1999) attribute this attitude to the “no waste” attitude found in human
Psychology.
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The empirical literature has been more developed on the subject with papers such as Dunne et al. (1989);
Mitchell (1994), Audretsch and Mahmood (1994), Haverman (1995), Geroski et al. (2010) Huynh et al.
(2008). Theoretically, on the other hand, size effects on growth and survival is harder to find. Jonavovic
(1982), a reference, assumes that initial size does not matter and current size includes all the information on
the firm history allowing survival or exit. This is contrary to some of the empirical findings cited above
reporting the importance of initial size for survival.
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probability by 9.6 percent (exp (-0.101) = 0.9039) and increases PPs’ survival probability by 11.3
percent (exp (-0.120) = 0.8869). Therefore, the marginal contribution of one employee is larger
for product providers63. The size effect is stronger on product providers than service providers.
Product providers clearly have an advantage in this dimension, and Table 2.6 confirms that PPs
are on average larger. Thus, H6 is also confirmed. Although this is an interesting finding, neither
the fourth nor the fifth models explain SPs’ greater likelihood of survival compared to product
providers.
Overall, in the sixth model, both H1 and H2 are rejected, while H3, H5 and H6 are
supported. The sign on the industry wage’s coefficient does seem to confirm H3, although the
coefficient is insignificant. Thus, I can neither confirm nor reject the hypothesis 3. The coefficient
on PP remains significant, and therefore none of the hypotheses was able to explain PPs’ higher
failure probability.
•

Other possible explanations.
A lack of data did not permit me to test two additional hypotheses that could contribute to

the higher survival rate of service providers over product providers. The first one is tax evasion,
not to be mistaken with tax avoidance. On the one hand, tax avoidance consists of finding ways
not to pay taxes through legal means. Tax evasion, on the other hand, consists of using illegal
means to avoid them. Tax evasion comes in many forms, and inspiration does not seem to be in
short supply when it comes to finding new ways to escape reporting sales. Some businesses
practice tax evasion to retain higher revenues, while others cannot report their sales to authorities
because of the illegal nature of their activities. This kind of evasion gave birth to what is now
referred to as the shadow, black or underground economy. Slemrod (2007) explains that the
underground economy mostly involves the provision of services that are not necessarily illegal

63

This is what we would expect. Size should have a larger effect of PPs than SPs.
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but become illicit owing to tax evasion. Davis and Henrekson (2005) claim that the underground
economy seems to flourish as tax levels rise. This is the effect of a supply decrease in the labor
market, and increases in home labor and the underground market. Fichtenbaum (1989) argues that
the underground economy is mostly composed of small businesses that offer services because of
the ease of exchanging them for cash or other services. Hence, the literature seems to agree that
SPs are more likely to evade taxes, allowing them to increase revenues and profits. Assuming that
higher revenues—ceteris paribus—increase survival probability, then, by transitive property, SPs
are more likely to survive.
Table 2.8
Regressions Stacking Variables
Variables
PP
PB
SP capital
per worker
PP capital
per worker
PB capital
per worker
Expenses
per worker
Owners’
experience
Industry
wage
SP assets

Base Model
0.304***
(0.105)
-0.128*
(0.0774)

Model 1
0.341***
(0.117)
-0.107
(0.0843)
-0.0799
(0.0510)
-0.228**
(0.111)
-0.0746
(0.0621)

Model 2
0.326***
(0.117)
-0.0975
(0.0843)
-0.0599
(0.0505)
-0.190*
(0.102)
-0.0502
(0.0610)
-0.0159***
(0.00503)

Model 3
0.297**
(0.119)
-0.109
(0.0856)
-0.0700
(0.0535)
-0.179*
(0.101)
-0.0550
(0.0638)
-0.0177***
(0.00531)
-0.0156***
(0.00396)

Model 4
0.297**
(0.119)
-0.109
(0.0855)
-0.0706
(0.0536)
-0.179*
(0.102)
-0.0557
(0.0639)
-0.0177***
(0.00532)
-0.0157***
(0.00396)
-0.153
(0.104)

PP assets
PB assets

Model 5
0.251**
(0.122)
-0.0976
(0.0865)
0.0711
(0.0583)
-0.128
(0.0833)
0.0745
(0.0641)
-0.0174***
(0.00504)
-0.0149***
(0.00396)
-0.163
(0.103)
-0.0951***
(0.0352)
-0.0237
(0.0299)
-0.0861**
(0.0337)

SP size
PP size
PB size
Observations
14,881
13,887
13,744
13,344
13,336
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

65

13,336

Model 6
0.324**
(0.157)
-0.247**
(0.115)
-0.0916
(0.0827)
-0.419***
(0.111)
0.0174
(0.0773)
-0.0172***
(0.00475)
-0.0142***
(0.00390)
-0.167
(0.104)
0.000714
(0.0404)
0.112***
(0.0408)
-0.0526
(0.0382)
-0.101***
(0.0254)
-0.120***
(0.0401)
-0.0314*
(0.0174)
13,336

The second argument I could not study empirically gets its origins from the relationship
marketing (RM) literature. The RM scholars agree that the relationship between a firm and its
customers is essential for the firm’s survival64. It seems that SPs are more likely to engage in
social human bonds with their customers that will endure for the duration of the relationship
(Gronroos, 1990; Czepiel, 1990; Iacobucci, 1994). Bendapudi and Berry (1997) cite three main
reasons why customers are more likely to engage in long-term relations with service providers.
First, many services—by definition—require customers to commit to long-term relationships by
locking them into contracts65. Cable provision, insurance, education and extended warranties, are
just few examples of service providers locking their customers into long term contracts. Second,
hiring an SP without committing to a long-term contract still requires a risk analysis that entails
asymmetric information66 in the relationship, representing a cost. Changing SPs on a regular basis
necessitates new risk analyses, and hence new costs. Retaining the same SPs minimizes cost. For
instance, when a person finds a hairdresser that provides her/him with satisfactory results, it is
very unlikely she/he will seek out a new hairdresser. Finally, a customer is more likely to
establish a relationship with an organization through its employees than through its products67.
Thus, this human aspect associated with SPs (but defaulting in PPs) should be positively linked to
survival.
•

Some words about providers of both (PB) service(s) and product(s).
Although this paper does not intend to study PBs, I give the reader an overview of the

literature as well as the results found in the analysis. The data show a trend of firms shifting their
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See Bendapudi and Berry (1997).
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This argument was studied in Lovelock (1983).
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From Bendapudi and Berry (1997): “…customers may seek on-going relationships with service providers
to reduce the perceived risk in evaluating services characterized by intangibility and credence properties.”
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See Berry (1995).
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interests from PPs and SPs to PBs (refer to the data section and Table 2.4). Theoretically, it
makes sense for firms to become providers of both.
They get the benefits of selling a product and attracting customers that need to visualize
what they are paying for. At the same time, they can secure those customers into contracts that
extend for a long period of time. According to Agrawal, Cohen and Zheng (1997) manufacturers
are maximizing service quality with enormous markups on service parts in order to maximize
service revenue through maintenance contracts after short warranty periods before feeling
comfortable letting the customer seek maintenance via independent service providers. Cohen and
Whang (1997), by means of a game-strategic set up, studied the difference between a
manufacturer and an independent service provider that results from the differentiation in service
quality and price. Among their findings, they argue that a large portion of a manufacturer’s
revenue was derived from the service business offered to their customers. Empirically, I can only
make the comparison of PBs to SPs, given PBs and PPs, both in the regressions with SPs acting
as missing variable. Referring to both Tables 2.7 and 2.8, we established that any hypothesis
alone—and/or together with other hypotheses—is enough to explain the higher odd of survival of
providers of both over service providers. The significance on PB vanishes when any variable is
added to the regression.
2.5 Conclusion
This study hopefully contributes positively to the literature by looking at firms’ survival
from a new perspective. I showed that once the contributors to survival were allowed to act
differently, when firms are differentiated in the product-service spectrum, new results could be
found increasing our knowledge on firms’ survival.
Using the KFS as the main dataset, I studied the consequences of the choice firms make
on being PPs or SPs on survival. I also included the option to be a PB although this was not the
main purpose of this study. I might need to compare PBs to both SPs and PPs in order to see how
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beneficial it could be to firms’ survival. When the decision to enter in one part of the “productservice spectrum” is taken, firms could benefit themselves from the general behavior of other
similar firms. For instance, on average, we see that product providers are larger, they have more
assets, more capital per worker and more expenses when compared to service providers. On the
other hand, SPs are more experienced than PPs and additionally they pay higher wages68.
Employing a Cox proportional hazard model, I found that the base model does confirm
service providers’ higher survival probability as compared to product providers. The behaviors
associated with the decision to be a PP or an SP were tested to find whether one, or a combination
of them, could explain the reasons for the higher survival probability found for service providers
over product providers. Unfortunately, none of the stated hypotheses (capital per worker,
expenses per worker, owners’ experience, size, assets and industry wage) could bring the
coefficient on PP to be insignificant, and all those variables were rejected as possible explanatory
factors in SPs higher survival likelihood. Two other possible explanations were discussed but not
tested opening the door to future research. The first one is the higher likelihood for SPs to evade
taxes and therefore increase revenue. Fichtenbaum (1989) explains that firms evading taxes
(underground economy) are more likely small businesses specializing in providing service(s). The
higher probability of evading taxes associated with service providers could explain how SPs are,
on average, more likely to survive. The second possible explanation is the human-bonding
experiences that service providers enjoy over product providers. Service providers can lock
customers into long-term contracts hence insuring repeat business. Other benefits include the cost
associated to asymmetric information emerging from the business-customer relationship and the
human social interaction SPs are able to offer thanks to the increasing personal knowledge of
each individual customer.

68

Service providers have greater values for the variables usually used to proxy experience and quality.
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Although this paper has not found (empirically) the reasons for SPs higher survival
probability, new findings emerged that offer a better understanding of firms’ survival. Capital per
worker is a very important contributor to PPs’ survival. The results show that an increase of
$100,000 in capital per worker for PPs will decrease their exit probability by 20.39 percent. The
results found on size are contradictory to the literature69. I found that PPs seem to benefit from
higher positive marginal effect size on survival (PPs are larger on average). Last, but not least, I
found that an increase in assets was actually increasing the hazard for PPs, something previous
research has not established. Once the positive effect associated with size70 is controlled for and
when we allow the coefficients on PPs and SPs to be different, I do find a significant coefficient
on PPs’ assets suggesting that assets in themselves are negatively related to survival.
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Namely, service industries known to be labor intensive as opposed to product-providing industries that
are known to be capital intensive, I expected the firm’s number of employees as proxy for size to have a
higher positive marginal effect on survival for SPs.
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Assets are a good measure of size. I can assume that the more assets a firm owns the larger it is.

69

REFERENCES
Abraham, K.G. & Taylor, S.K., 1996. Firms’ use of outside contractors: theory and evidence.
Journal of Labor Economics, 14(3), pp.394-424.
Agrawal, V., Cohen, M.A. & Zhen, Y.-S., 1997. Service parts logistics: a benchmark analysis. IIE
Transactions, 29, p.627+.
Arkes, H.R. & Ayton, P., 1999. The sunk cost and Concorde effects: Are humans less rational
than lower animals? Psychological Bulletin, 125(5), pp.591-600.
Åstebro, T. & Bernhardt, I., 2003. Start-up financing, owner characteristics, and survival. Journal
of Economics and Business, 55(4), pp.303-319.
Audretsch, D.B., 1991. New-firm survival and the technological regime. The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 73(3), pp.441-450.
Audretsch, D.B. & Mahmood, T., 1994. The rate of hazard confronting new firms and plants in
U.S. manufacturing. Review of Industrial Organization, 9(1), pp.41-56.
Barney, J., 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management,
17(1), pp.99 -120.
Baumol, W.J., 1967. Macroeconomics of unbalanced growth: the anatomy of urban crisis. The
American Economic Review, 57(3), pp.415-426.
Baumol, W.J., Blackman, S.A.B. & Wolff, E.N., 1985. Unbalanced growth revisited: asymptotic
stagnancy and new evidence. The American Economic Review, 75(4), pp.806-817.
Bendapudi, N. & Berry, L.L., 1997. Customers’ motivations for maintaining relationships with
service providers. Journal of Retailing, 73(1), pp.15-37.
Berry, L.L., 1995. On great service: A framework for action., New York: The Free Press.
Bhattacherjee, A., 2001. An empirical analysis of the antecedents of electronic commerce service
continuance. Decision Support Systems, 32(2), pp.201-214.
Bolton, R.N., 1998. A dynamic model of the duration of the customer’s relationship with a
continuous service provider: the role of satisfaction. Marketing Science, 17(1), pp.45-65.
Braymen, C.B. & Neymotin, F., 2011. Immigrant enclaves and the success of entrepreneurial
ventures. Available at: SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1518929.
Cohen, M.A. & Whang, S., 1997. Competing in product and service: a product life-cycle model.
Management Science, 43(4), pp.535-545.
Cooley, T.F. & Quadrini, V., 2001. Financial markets and firm dynamics. The American
Economic Review, 91(5), pp.1286-1310.
Cox, D.R., 1972. Regression models and life-tables. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society.
Series B (Methodological), 34(2), pp.187-220.

70

Czepiel, J.A., 1990. Service encounters and service relationships: Implications for research.
Journal of Business Research, 20(1), pp.13-21.
Davis, S.J. & Henrekson, M., 2005. Tax effects on work activity, industry mix and shadow
economy size: evidence from rich-country comparisons. R. Gomez Salvador et al., eds. In
Labour Supply and Incentives to Work in Europe. Edward Elgar Press.
Dunne, T., Roberts, M.J. & Samuelson, L., 1989. The growth and failure of U. S. manufacturing
plants. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(4), pp.671-698.
Evans, D.S. & Jovanovic, B., 1989. An estimated model of entrepreneurial choice under liquidity
constraints. Journal of Political Economy, 97(4), pp.808-827.
Falvey, R.E. & Gemmell, N., 1996. Are services income-elastic? Some new evidence. Review of
Income and Wealth, 42(3), pp.257-269.
Fazzari, S.M., Hubbard, G.R. & Petersen., B.C., 1988. Financing constraints and corporate
investment. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, pp.141-195.
Fichtenbaum, R., 1989. The Productivity slowdown and the underground economy. Quarterly
Journal of Business and Economics, 28, pp.78-90.
Freund, C. & Weinhold, D., 2002. The internet and international trade in services. The American
Economic Review, 92(2), pp.236-240.
Geroski, P.A., Mata, J. & Portugal, P., 2010. Founding conditions and the survival of new firms.
Strategic Management Journal, 31(5), pp.510-529.
Gordon, R.H., 1998. Can high personal tax rates encourage entrepreneurial activity? IMF Staff
Papers, 45(1), pp.49-80.
Gronroos, C., 1990. Relationship approach to marketing in service contexts: The marketing and
organizational behavior interface. Journal of Business Research, 20(1), pp.3-11.
Hall, B.H., 1987. The Relationship between firm size and firm growth in the US manufacturing
sector. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 35(4), pp.583-606.
Haveman, H.A., 1995. The demographic metabolism of organizations: industry dynamics,
turnover, and tenure distributions. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40(4), pp.586-618.
Huyhebaert, N., Gaeremynck, A. & Van de Gucht, L. M., 2000. New firm survival: the effects of
start-up characteristics. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 27(5-6), pp.627-651.
Huynh, K.P., Petrunia, R.J. & Voia, M.C., 2010. The impact of initial financial state on firm
duration across entry cohorts.The Journal of Industrial Economics, 58(3), pp.661-689.
Huynh, K.P., Petrunia, R.J. & Voia, M.C., 2008. Startup financial conditions and survival of new
firms. In DRUID 25th Celebration Conference 2008. Copenhagen.
Iacobucci, D., 1994. Toward Defining Relationship Marketing. In Relationship Marketing:
Theory, methods and applications proceedings of the 1994 Research Conference. Center
for Relationship Marketing, Emory University, Atlanta, pp. 89-97.

71

Jovanovic, B., 1982. Selection and the evolution of industry. Econometrica, 50(3), pp.649-670.
Kalleberg, A.L. & Leicht, K.T., 1991. Gender and organizational performance: determinants of
small business survival and success. The Academy of Management Journal, 34(1),
pp.136-161.
Kennickell, A.B., 1998. List sample design for the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Kennickell, A.B., 1999. Multiple imputation and disclosure protection: The case of the 1995
survey of consumer finances. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the
European Communities, pp.381-400.
Klepper, S. & Simons, K.L., 2000. The making of an oligopoly: firm survival and technological
change in the evolution of the U.S. tire industry. Journal of Political Economy, 108(4),
pp.728-760.
Lovelock, C.H., 1983. Classifying services to gain strategic marketing insights. The Journal of
Marketing, 47(3), pp.9-20.
Lucas, R.E., 1978. On the size distribution of business firms. The Bell Journal of Economics,
9(2), pp.508-523.
Mata, J. & Portugal, P., 1994. Life duration of new firms. The Journal of Industrial Economics,
42(3), pp.227-245.
Mitchell, W., 1994. The dynamics of evolving markets: the effects of business sales and age on
dissolutions and divestitures. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(4), pp.575-602.
Murray, M.N., 1997. Would tax evasion and tax avoidance undermine national retail sales tax?
National Tax Journal, 50(1), pp.167-182.
Oppenheimer, V., 1970. The female labor force in the United States; demographic and economic
factors concerning its growth and changing composition. Population Monograph Series,
No. 5., Publications Office, Institute of International Studies, 2538 Channing Way, Room
215, Berkeley, California 94720.
Priest, G.L., 2007. A theory of the consumer product warranty. In Economic Analysis of the Law.
Blackwell Publishing Ltd, pp. 111-121.
Raa, T.T. & Wolff, E., 2001. Outsourcing of services and the productivity recovery in U.S.
manufacturing in the 1980s and 1990s. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 16(2), p.149.
Robb, A. & Coleman, S., 2009. The impact of financial capital on business performance: a
comparison
of
womenand
men-owned
firms.
Available
at:
http://ssrn.com/paper=1400742.
Robb, A., Ballou, J., DesRoches, D., Potter, F., Zhao, Z. & Reedy, E.J., 2010. An overview of the
Kauffman Firm Survey. Kauffman Foundation.
Shane, S., 2008. The illusions of entrepreneurship: The costly myths that entrepreneurs,
investors, and policy makers live by, New Heaven: Yale University Press.

72

Sharma, A. & Kesner, I.F., 1996. Diversifying Entry: Some ex ante explanations for postentry
survival and growth. The Academy of Management Journal, 39(3), pp.635-677.
Slemrod, J., 2007. Cheating ourselves: The economics of tax evasion. The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 21(1), pp.25-48.
Thompson, P., 2005. Selection and firm survival: Evidence from the Shipbuilding Industry, 18251914. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(1), pp.26-36.
Watson, J., 2003. Failure rates for female-controlled businesses: are they any different? Journal
of Small Business Management, 41, pp.262-277.
Wernerfelt, B., 1984. A resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 5(2),
pp.171-180.
Youndt, M.A., Snell, S.A., Dean, J.W. & Lepak, D.P., 1996. Human resource management,
manufacturing strategy, and firm performance. The Academy of Management Journal,
39(4), pp.836-866.
Zingales, L., 1998. Survival of the fittest or the fattest? Exit and financing in the trucking
industry. The Journal of Finance, 53(3), pp.905-938.

73

CHAPTER 3
Why are Women-Owned Firms Associated with Higher Failure Rates? A Cross Gender
Survival Analysis using the KFS.
3.1 Introduction
Previous research has extensively covered the field of survival and gender differences in
business settings. Surprisingly, given the amount of studies published, researchers still have many
disagreements about the mechanism at work in determining the effects of being women-owned on
a startup's (or firm's) survival. More precisely, a majority of studies have found women to have
higher failure rates than their men counterparts, but much of this effect may be explained by
human capital, industries (Watson 2003), financial capital (Boden and Nucci 2000) or
management style (Carter, Williams, and Reynolds 1997). Others, such as Kalleberg and Leicht
(1991), have found no negative effects of gender on survival. These opposing results could be
attributed to different factors. First, the definition of failure in the literature71 varies from broad to
specific. For example, some scholars have defined failure as discontinuation 72 of the firm,
including a change of ownership 73 , while others believe that a firm sold does not constitute
failure. Another possibility for the lack of consistent results could be the lack of data on womenowned firms.
While comparing women- and men-owned firms’ success or failure, social and/or
psychological aspects could be at play. The fact that women and men have had differing pasts in
the labor market could influence the way they manage or their perception of success. Women are
less preoccupied with profits than men (Burns, Carter, Hamilton and Rosa 1994). Therefore, if a
man does not get a financial return greater or equal to what he would have made as an employee,
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Headd (2003) studies the differences in the definitions of success and failure.
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Bates (1995); Bates and Nucci (1989); Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989) define failure as
discontinuance.
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Churchill (1952); Watson and Everett (1999).
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even if the firm is still profitable, he would most likely close, and the firm would be registered as
a failure. On the other hand, a woman who gets a lower financial return from her business, as
compared to what she could have made in the labor market, could choose to keep the company
afloat because of the greater flexibility associated with her work schedule, hence reducing failure
rates for women. A greater flexibility implies that she can choose when to work and still take care
of her home. Thus, there are different maximization problems associated with gender when the
decision to remain or exit is made. Furthermore, women and men differ in their evaluation of
priorities (Orban 2001).
Firm survival analysis has also been conducted using many economic variables, which
are mostly endogenous of social differences, such as accumulated human capital. Historically,
women have had less access to education, although the gap is now closing. The actual cross
gender differences in education are mostly attributed to the field of education sought by women
and men (Honing-Haftel and Martin 1986). Women are more prone to follow liberal arts majors,
while men seem to be attracted to technical fields, such as business. Boden and Nucci (2000)
hypothesize that the differences among genders that impose a higher burden on women-owned
firms’ survival could be explained by the lower opportunities offered to women in the wage
market. According to Boden and Nucci, answers to financial capital and experience differences
can be explained by the lower wages offered to women on average and the lower managerial jobs
women partake in. Others have used differences in industry concentrations to explain that women
are more active in the retail and services industries, which are more competitive because they are
associated with lower barriers of entry (Watson 2003; Coleman and Robb 2009).
Linking both social and labor market experiences, Carter, et al. (1997) suggest that
women can use what the authors refer to as “women dispositional characteristics” to overcome
deficiencies induced by their “situational differences.” Situational differences result from the
reality that women have been denied equal access to labor markets, while dispositional
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characteristics are linked to the way women define their values and way of thinking
(psychological aspect).
A recurring idea in the literature relates women’s lower survival rates to women’s lower
abilities or opportunities (depending if you view it from the demand or supply side) for them to
gather enough financial capital for their startup to grow and survive. It is true that women tend to
reach to debt institutions and equity holders less than men. Using the Kauffman Firm Survey
(KFS), Coleman and Robb (2009) studied differences in startup capital by gender. Coleman and
Robb find that women-owned startups tend to start with significantly less capital than those
started by men, and their results remain significant regardless of the addition of controls such as
firm’s and owner’s characteristics. Their contribution to the field was that women tend to raise
less capital through debt and equity in the years after foundation (second and third). Considering
this, it would be appealing to state that the inability to raise funds must be the reason behind
women’s lower survival rates in entrepreneurship. Lee and Zhang studied survival associated
with financial variables. They find that breaking down debt and equity into different sources was
necessary to find the real effects of financial variables. Women have long complained of
discrimination in the financial markets (Coleman and Robb 2009). Other papers have dismissed
any sign of discrimination in the financial markets and have attributed the differences in access to
financial capital to differences in human capital or the industry being operated. Thus, a review of
the literature provides the main points as to why women are associated with higher failure rates,
but it is difficult to say with certainty which economic variable explains this behavior.
Most of the studies conducted on gender firms’ survival were conducted (as far as I
know) on dated data sources. Therefore, the release of the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS), a
current longitudinal data set, motivated this paper. Social differences could be an explanation for
the higher rates of failure among women-owned firms, and social gaps between genders seem to
be diminishing as time passes (women are becoming a more significant part of the labor and
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entrepreneurship market). For these reasons, I believe that the effects of social differences could
be diminished in newer data sets. I also have found the empirical methodology in the literature to
be inconsistent. Namely, some papers74 only use a gender dummy variable in the study. Others
papers 75 are content to compare women-owned firms’ survival to those owned by men by
dividing the data sets and comparing coefficients. Finally, some papers76 have used interaction
variables. I will make use of the data at my disposal to find whether economic factors can explain
failure rate differences between genders. A proxy for owner’s confidence (combining the
sociological and psychological) is added as well.
My study will make use of two empirical methods to conduct a more complete survival
analysis. I first compare the hazard rates of the firms by using a Cox model. The first empirical
method allows me to analyze each variable effect within each subsample and determine whether
there are different marginal effects associated with each subgroup. I find that size has a larger
negative marginal effect on women-owned firms’ failure. Taking into account that women’s
management styles more often consider employees’ satisfaction 77 to be important, that
satisfaction motivates employees, and assuming that employees’ satisfaction increases the
marginal product of labor, the results seem reasonable. The first empirical method used for the
survival analysis also reveals that confidence in holding a competitive advantage is more
beneficial to the survival of firms owned by men.
The second empirical model allows interactive gender variables to be added. I ran
consecutive regressions after stacking variables, along with their interactive pairs. Only when the
competitive advantage variable is added does the gender variable become insignificant. The
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model’s results point out that differences in social and psychological variables play an important
role in explaining women-owned firms’ higher failure rates. Overall, the full model is unable to
fully explain why women-owned firms are associated with higher failure rates.
The paper is organized as follows: I first provide the reader with a review of the literature
on how gender differences affect firms’ survival. This review will concentrate mostly, but not
exclusively, on the variables I use herein. I then give a brief overview of the KFS and provide
some descriptive analyses for some of the variables. The third section provides the empirical
models and corresponding results. The first model is the gender comparison survival analysis,
which precedes the main survival analysis with successive regressions that clarifies womenowned firms’ higher chances of failure. Finally, I conclude the paper with a review of the findings
and suggestions for future research.
3.2 The Literature Review
The literature on firms’ success or the survival prospects of firms is extensive. However,
only a small part of it is dedicated to gender differences. As society evolves, it has become more
evident that there was a need for more research as women started to gain strength in the business
environment. Women, as entrepreneurs, have been a growing part of the new creators of small
businesses in America, although men are still more likely to be self-employed (Kalleberg and
Leicht 1991). Therefore, it is important to understand what factors influence women for business
success and survival. There is research that has concentrated on studying women-owned
businesses’ performance in terms of growth, revenue, profit, and other business success measures.
This branch has reported that women-owned firms tend to perform worse than men-owned
businesses (Aldrich 1989; Cuba, DeCenzo, and Anish 1983; Du Rietz and Henrekson 2000;
Anna, Chandler, Jansen and Mero 1999). Another branch concentrated on survival. Nevertheless,
there is an important link between both branches of the literature given that one is a consequence
of the other.
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It is reasonable to assume that a business fails because of its performance78. Therefore,
most of the variables studied in either branch are often found in the other branch of the literature.
There are few agreements among researchers. To be more accurate, there is little we can assert
with confidence. After considering the reasons that could explain this lack of harmony among
studies, I first describe what we know, or what we agree most upon, before discussing the
different theories that explain the differences in survival rates between women-owned and menowned businesses.
Carter, et al. (1997) assert that the lack of empirical findings that would corroborate each
other had been attributed to “inadequate research design” and “varying assumptions” by
researchers. For example the definition of failure is still not agreed upon among studies. Some
researchers define failure as entrepreneurs not being able to reach the goals they set for their
companies at startup 79 . Over-optimism is a well-known characteristic among entrepreneurs
(Cassar and Craig 2009). Others have defined failure as a firm’s discontinuation or the business
being sold or bankrupt (Watson and Everett 1993).
Among the previous studies there seems to be an agreement among researchers on a
higher failure rate experienced by women-owned businesses. Most research found that womenowned businesses are more likely to fail.
Bates (1995) studied the survival rates of newly started firms and franchises in the retail
industry using the 1987 Characteristics of Business Owners dataset. Bates (1995) confirmed that
firms owned by men were more likely to survive. Some studies were not able to find reasons for
the higher likelihood of failure of women-owned firms. Kalleberg and Leicht’s (1991) coefficient
for gender was insignificant within the general sample regression. This finding was echoed in Lee
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and Zhang’s working paper. Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon and Woo (1994) found that women-owned
firms were just as likely to survive, but were less likely to grow than men-owned firms.
Many researchers have investigated women’s higher business failure rate by analyzing
differences between men and women. For instance, Watson (2003) controlled for industry
because previous research found evidence that women tend to be over-represented in certain
specific industries such as retail and service industries. Kalleberg and Leicht (1991) referred to
this as the “female ghetto”. Brush and Chaganti (1999) affirmed that the retail and service
industries tend to be at the bottom of the value chain, which tends to imply lower returns. Their
results confirmed previous studies such as Rosa, Carter and Hamilton (1996), which argued that
some of the differences between men and women-owned firms lie in the fact that women have a
tendency to start businesses in low-return industries. Hutchinson, Hutchinson and Newcomers
(1938) noted that industries with lower capital requirements tend to have a higher failure rate
because of lower barriers to entry that increase competition (Brüderl, Preisendörfer and Ziegler
1992). Furthermore, the fact that women use less financial capital on average (Coleman and Robb
2009) (the reasons for this are discussed later) completes a formula for increased failure rates.
However, it is not known if women have a preference for the industries cited above because of
their lower financial capital requirements (Brush and Chaganti, 1999) or whether women prefer
these industries because they fit their management styles.
The age of businesses has also been linked to women’s higher failure rates. Some have
argued that women-owned firms are younger on average than men-owned firms and that, because
younger firms are more likely to fail (Evans 1987), age could thus be a variable negatively linked
to women-owned firms’ survival ability (Rosa, et al. 1996; Carter, et al. 1997).
The survival literature has consistently agreed that a firm’s size is an important
contributor to survival (Mata and Portugal 1994; Geroski, et al. 2010). The bigger a firm is at
startup, the more it has access to financial markets. Financial institutions may interpret a larger
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firm as reflecting the entrepreneur’s confidence in the project and are therefore more likely to
invest. Women-owned firms have a tendency to be smaller, on average (Charboneau 1981;
Humphreys and McClung 1981; Coleman 2002; Robb and Wolken 2002; Fairlie and Robb 2009).
It is hard to say why; the possibilities are numerous. As mentioned previously, it could be because
a majority of women start their businesses from home, which puts an upper limit on the number
of employees they can hire. It could also be that women have less access to financial markets.
Consequently, women have more constraints on liquidity than men, and have a lower capacity for
hiring employees80, which makes it harder to raise future financial capital.
Another possibility is that women’s management style is a better fit for smaller groups.
While studying a small sample of women, Sheppard (1992) reported that women portrayed their
management style as being based on maintaining good relationships and being people oriented.
She affirmed that women have a strong propensity for basing their decision making on personal
relations.
Human capital is usually described as the owners’ own attributes, acquired through selfinvestment. Easier-to-measure proxies of human capital have often been measures of experience
and education. It has been reported that the more specific to an industry previously acquired
experience is, the higher the likelihood of survival (Thompson 2005; Van de Ven, Hudson and
Schroeder 1984). Theoretically, many factors possibly affecting women-owned firms’ higher
failure rates could be endogenous results of differences in human capital between men and
women. The differences could be at any level of the many spectrums of experience. Running a
business as an entrepreneur can be associated with many differing levels of experience, and the
question of whether the previous years of experience were acquired in the same or an identical
industry has been shown to be deterministic of survival. Taking into account experience acquired
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while starting a business rather than that of acquiring an older business that has already overcome
the challenges of earlier stages of growth is also a major step towards understanding startup
survival. Cromie and Birley (1991) reported that women’s previous experience was less likely to
have been acquired while starting a business. Carter, et al. (1997) found, however, that men
seemed to be using the experience acquired from starting previous companies to improve their
survival chances. On the other hand, the lack of startup experience for women did not affect
survival chances differently. Simply said, women with previous startup experience did not use
this advantage to increase survival probability. Boden and Nucci (2000) hypothesize that women,
on average, acquire less human capital because of differences in the labor market. Boden and
Nucci believe that differences in the labor market (women have historically held lower wage jobs
than men) explain why women’s accumulated experience and financial capital stock is less than
men’s.
Education is another measure of human capital that has been widely used in the literature.
Honing-Haftel and Martin (1986) report differences among women and men in the areas they
seek education in. Women seem to be more attracted to studies in liberal arts, while men are more
likely to seek education in technical disciplines81. Education in liberal arts is less likely to yield
advantages in skills, such as management, finance and development of new technologies, all part
of the daily tasks of an entrepreneur. Orban (2001) reported the results of a survey she conducted
on women and men in which she asked entrepreneurs to self-evaluate their competencies in
different fields. Women who owned firms with employees in the range of 1 to 499, believed
themselves to have deficiencies in financial skills. For firms in the range of 10 to 499 employees,
women still believed they had lower financial skills than their men counterparts. Men consistently
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evaluated themselves above women’s self-evaluations for managerial skills
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as well.

Interestingly, women in the range of 1 to 499 employees evaluated themselves above men’s selfevaluation for technical skills. The question is not really whether women are less educated than
men83, but rather how do they educate themselves?
Family commitment and the ability to devote enough time to business is an aspect
differentiating women and men (Fasci and Valdez 1998). Women have reported challenges in
balancing their time between home duties and time to dedicate to their businesses. Assuming that
a firm’s survival is a positive function of time invested into the business (Boden and Nucci 2000),
women-owned firms are therefore more likely to fail (Fasci and Valdez 1998; Birley 1989).
Women are attracted to the idea of operating their businesses from home. It allows them to take
care of their families and run their businesses. Boden and Nucci (2000) used a dummy variable
for home-based businesses on two samples of the Characteristics of Business Owners survey
(1982 and 1987). They reported that businesses operating from home were less likely to use
financial capital at startup and therefore were less likely to survive. One reason is that homeoperated businesses have an upper limit in size, which in turn could be a negative signal sent to
financial institutions that will result in lower financial capital availability.
Among the greatest debate found in the literature is the question of whether or not
women are discriminated against in the financial markets (Coleman and Robb 2009). The
question was raised because women usually mention that they face some discriminatory treatment
when they apply for loans with financial institutions. However, I was not able to find any study
that could present results to defend this argument. It is true that women use less capital than men
both at startup and in the early stages of a company’s life. Coleman and Robb (2009) studied the

82

Hisrich (1985) reported that women lack experience in the financial and managerial fields of business.

83

Mahot (1997) reported than in the E.U. countries, women’s education was equivalent to or even higher
than men’s.

83

KFS and found that the women in the sample started their firms with significantly less financial
capital than men, and that women also tend to raise less capital in the second and third years of
the firm’s life. Their results remained significant even after controlling for the usual measures of
human capital. However, whether this is an effect of the supply (the financial institutions’
selection process) or of the demand side (entrepreneurs’ application for financing) of financial
markets is harder to say. They found evidence that financial institutions tend to invest more in
firms with specific characteristics such as hours spent in the business, prior startup experience
and being classified as an organization; these characteristics are not usually associated with
women-owned businesses. They also found that women relied more heavily on personal sources
of debt and equity, while other research has found women to be more risk averse84 than men,
leading them to start smaller and more manageable businesses. This would indicate that women
themselves are reluctant to apply for external debt and equity. Other papers have indicated that
the lower amount of capital raised by women was the results of differences in human capital and
the variations could be explained by differences in experience and education between the genders.
Tigges and Green (1994) suggested that women’s lower levels of experience and lower amounts
of equity invested into their businesses might explain women’s reduced access to capital markets.
Boden and Nucci’s (2000) paper and results are very interesting, as they may show the
roots of the financial capital difficulties. Assuming that women's wages in the labor market are
actually lower than men’s, and that past wages constitute the main source of startup capital,
Boden and Nucci found that survival was indeed positively related to startup capital 85 . The
negative effects of the demand side consist of women being less likely to apply for loans,
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although they are not more likely to be turned down. A couple of studies confirmed demand-side
effects on the financial markets (Coleman 2002; Cole and Mehran 2009; Treichel and Scott
2006). This is a puzzle, as women insist on encountering barriers to secure loans in a study by
Constantinidis, Cornet and Asandei (2006), yet when the authors separated the firms by growth
potential, they found that women with higher growth-potential firms encountered less barriers. I
would like to add that the only reference to discrimination in the financial markets I was able to
find in the literature was reported mostly by surveys that would describe women’s feelings.
Women's lower use of financial institutions' services were, usually, the results of other factors
that are characteristic of women-owned firms, whether it was human capital, the industry,
motivation, or any other factor besides gender. No matter what the causes were, women are more
concerned with access to capital than any other problem in managing their businesses (Orser,
Hogarth-Scott and Riding, 2000).
Women may be less concerned with financial rewards that men are (Rosa, et al. 1994;
Brush 1992), and thus women may pursue a different level of satisfaction when they start a
business. Brush (1992) indicated that women thought of their business more as a “cooperative
network of relationships” than a “profit-making entity.” Nonetheless, Orban (2001) found that
women and men classified their motivations more or less in the same order but weighed them
differently. For instance, in Orban’s sample, independence and self-accomplishment were ranked
first in both groups of men and women, but women indicated that prestige attributes, such as
social status and power, had a lower value to them as compared to men. These differences in
motivation lead to differences in management styles as well. Sheppard (1992) reported that
women believed their management style was less cost oriented, with an accent on persuasion and
personal relations86. My study will not address these latest issues given that the KFS does not
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provide information on management style or preferences. There are other differences reported in
the literature87, but it is my belief that the ones reported herein provide a good basis for the
reader’s general understanding of the question.
3.3 The KFS and Descriptive Statistics
•

The Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS)
The KFS is a random sample of 4,928 businesses taken from an initial pool of 32,429

firms from the Dun and Bradstreet (DB) database created in 2004. The baseline questionnaire was
sent in 2004, and follow-up questionnaires were sent every year following that. So far, five
following waves consisting of data from 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 have been added to
the baseline. The dataset contains information on a variety of topics, including financing,
organizational structure and legal status, business characteristics and strategies, owner
demographics, and work behavior.
To be part of the KFS sample, a startup could not be a spin-off, a subsidiary of any other
business, or inherited by previous owners. The sample weights were adjusted accordingly for
surviving firms that chose not to answer.
Some firms surveyed could also be firms created to reduce taxes on individuals. It has
been shown in prior research, both theoretical and empirical (Åstebro and Bernhadt 2003; Gordon
1998), that paying fewer taxes could be an incentive for individuals to create companies as tax
shelters, because corporate tax rules are often advantageous compared to income taxes. I expect
some of the firms surveyed were also created as tax shelters. The way I chose to correct for this
issue was to drop the firms that reported no sales in all years of activity (33 observations were
deleted).
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Table 3.1
Industry Distribution in the KFS
KFS New
Employer
Businesses

Census
Employer
Firm Births

PSED New
Businesses

Professional (54), Management,
and Educational Services (61)

16.1

14.1

16.8

Retail Trade (44)

15.6

12.0

18.6

Administrative and Support, and Waste
Management and Remediation Services (56)

11.4

6.0

2.1

Construction (23)

9.8

15.7

10.0

Other Services (except Public Administration)
(81)

8.0

8.5

0.3

Manufacturing (31)

7.2

3.2

3.5

Wholesale Trade (42)

6.0

4.5

1.5

Real Estate, Rental and Leasing (53)

3.7

5.1

5.3

Finance and Insurance (52)

4.7

2.2

3.1

Health Care and Social Assistance (62)

4.2

7.7

2.9

Information (51)

2.6

1.4

4.2

Transportation and Warehousing (48)

2.9

3.3

2.4

Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation (71)

3.1

2.1

3.2

Accommodation and Food Services (72)

3.9

9.1

10.9

Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and hunting (11)

1.4

0.4

2.0

Mining (21)

0.0

0.3

0.5

Utilities (22)

0.0

0.1

0.5

Management of Companies and Enterprises (55)

0.0

0.1

6.7

Unclassified (99)

0.0

2.2

5.6

Industry Names and (Code)

Source: Kauffman Firm Survey, Baseline data: Tabulations by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc; and
Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, from longitudinal data (established with some
first-quarter payroll) provided by the U.S. Census Bureau; Reynolds, P. 2004. Entrepreneurship in the
United States Assesment, Miami, Fla: Florida International University.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that as compared to the U.S. Census, the distribution of
firms by industry in the KFS has higher proportions of businesses in certain industries88, such as
manufacturing, professional management, education, retail and wholesale, and finance and
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insurance, just to cite a few. However, the KFS has a lower proportion of firms in construction,
healthcare and social assistance, and accommodations and food services (see Table 3.1).
•

Descriptive statistics
An objective of the paper is to first check if women-owned firms are indeed more likely

to fail in the KFS, considering its novelty.
Each firm in the sample can describe 10 of its owners. If a firm has more than one owner,
the KFS declares the owner with the most equity invested in the firm to be the main owner. In
case of equal ownership, the KFS uses the number of hours worked and other characteristics to
determine the main owner. Therefore, if a firm’s main owner was found to be a woman, this firm
is classified as women-owned. 26 percent of firms were women-owned at startup in 2004. This
percentage decreases every year, among surviving firms, before reaching 15 percent in 2009 (see
Table 3.2). As mentioned in the literature review, studies use different definitions of failure. I
define discontinuance at time t as a firm that was active in the lagged period, t-1, and if the firm
has stopped operations temporarily (and does not reappear in any other period) or has declared to
be permanently out of business, or has declared to be out of business for any other reason besides
a change in ownership.
As demonstrated by the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard graph (see Figure 3.1), women
do have a higher likelihood of failure. Looking at the Nelson-Aalen graph, we see the difference
between the men-owned and women-owned curves is increasing in every period. This is an
indication that the difference in failure rates is increasing every year.
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Table 3.2
Summary Statistics for the Whole Sample
2004
Variables
Gender
Size
Main owner experience
Mean experience
Home Operation
Competitive advantage
Total debt
Total equity
Total equity OO
Total equity NOO
Total equity NOO formal
Total equity NOO nonformal

2005

2006

Mean
0.26
3.12
12.69
12.29
0.5
0.64
73,144
59,874
57,076
22,842
17,145

Sd
0.44
4.11
10.5
9.84
0.5
0.48
189,792
165,486
151,332
120,108
118,930

Mean
0.22
4.25
13.03
12.62
0.42
0.58
54,757
36,833
24,170
14,951
12,775

Sd
0.41
5.28
10.58
9.94
0.49
0.49
163,264
138,635
99,967
104,131
103,911

Mean
0.19
4.6
13.36
12.74
0.38
0.51
54,480
25,705
16,687
10,099
10,073

Sd
0.39
5.68
10.61
9.88
0.49
0.5
162,613
116,443
84,872
83,126
99,029

3,931

43,806

2,514

36,290

1,332

24,637

2007

2008

Variables
Mean
Sd
Gender
0.17
0.38
Size
4.63
6.31
Main owner experience
13.57
10.65
Mean experience
12.97
9.95
Home Operation
0.34
0.47
Competitive advantage
0.44
0.5
Total debt
46,678 150,625
Total equity
18,520
99,995
Total equity OO
11,827
70,444
Total equity NOO
6,945
70,976
Total equity NOO formal
6,064
77,876
Total equity NOO nonformal
1,345
23,359
Source: Kauffman Firm Survey, 2011 release.

2009

Mean
0.16
4.59
13.94
13.32
0.34
0.4
50,395
15,847
11,468
5,674
5,650

Sd
0.37
6.13
10.79
10.02
0.47
0.49
161,185
92,713
71,519
65,772
74,176

Mean
0.15
4.52
14.05
13.54
0.33
0.33
44,564
14,962
10,232
5,747
5,720

Sd
0.36
6.14
10.66
9.96
0.47
0.47
152,451
91,706
67,345
67,210
79,355

433

9,761

677

16,425

Table 3.3 shows the summary statistics for both men and women. I calculate the firm size
as the total number of employees working for the firm, including the number of operating owners.
We can see that women-owned firms are smaller on average than men-owned firms. The
difference in size seems to grow as the firms become older—although there is a big dispersion in
the distribution as shown by the standard deviations.
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Figure 3.1
Nelson-Aalen Cumulative Hazard Graph

Source: Kauffman Firm Survey, 2011 release.

The owners’ experience is defined by the KFS as the years of experience in the same
industry the firm competes in89. I link a firm’s experience to the levels reported by the firm’s
main owner. It seems that the KFS is no exception to previous findings. Women are, on average,
less experienced when compared to men.
I then look at home-operated businesses and whether the owners believe they hold a
competitive advantage over their competition. As expected, women are more likely to operate
from their homes. What is surprising is that the percentage of women operating from home does
not decrease as the firms grow older, although the percentage of men operating from home tends
to go down. We would expect firms—regardless of the owner’s gender—operating from home to
make up a lower part of the sample as firms start exiting (see Figure 3.2). If home-operated

89

This variable is bounded from above at 40 years.

90

businesses are more likely to exit, then it could be that women tend to move their businesses
home later in the life of the business90.
Figure 3.2
Home-Operated Businesses Comparison between Women- and Men-Owned Firms

Source: Kauffman Firm Survey, 2011 release.

I use the competitive advantage dummy to proxy for owner’s confidence. Given this is a
self-reported variable, I assume91 that owners do not have a clear idea of their advantage over the
competition in the early stages of the firm’s life. Therefore, an owner who declares having a
competitive advantage could be exhibiting a sign of confidence92. Surprisingly, the data suggest
that 68 percent of women-owned firms believe they held a competitive advantage at startup
compared to only 55 percent of men-owned firms. Overall, women seem to be more confident
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than men in their competitive advantage in every year of the firm’s existence. There could be
three explanations. The first one is that these data reflect the reality that women have a better
competitive advantage than men on average. The second possible explanation is that women
overvalue their competitive advantage position (optimism), and finally93, the third possibility is
that men undervalue their competitive advantage (pessimism).
Table 3.2 gives an overview of the financial variables94 for the whole sample. Debt seems
to be the preferred way to finance the startups when analyzing the whole sample, if we look at the
mean, but the standard deviation indicates that there is a big dispersion in the sample distribution.
Actually, all the financial variables shown in Table 3.2 are very dispersed95, which is why
I calculate the median96 of these variables. The medians for total debt and total equity are 751 and
4001, respectively, for 2004. Therefore, 50 percent of the sample used more equity than debt. The
medians for formal and non-formal sources of equity from non-owners/operators were both zero.
Therefore, the analysis through the mean can be misrepresenting the data. According to Coleman
and Robb (2009), findings on gender financing—using the three first waves of the KFS (2004,
2005, and 2006)—firms owned by men raised more money in the first three years of operations
when compared to women-owned firms (US $200,000 for men and US $120,000 for women).
They also found that women use less financial capital to start up their business and raise
considerably less financial capital than men in the following years (at least for 2005 and 2006) of
operations. Both women and men prefer internal to external sources of funds.
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Forbes (2005) found an negative correlation between overconfidence and survival rates.

94

Note that the variables “total debt” (and “total equity”) are the total amount of debt (equity) owed by the
firm at time t. It is both the amount of outstanding and new debt (equity) the firm used to finance its
operations.

95

The distribution of the financial variables is asymmetrical and positively skewed, as shown by the
financial variables’ detailed summary statistics in Appendix3.2.
96

Not shown here.
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Table 3.3
Summary Statistics Comparison between Genders
2004
Women-owned
Variables
Size
Main owner experience
Mean experience
Home Operation
Competitive advantage
Total debt
Total equity
Total equity OO
Total equity NOO
Total equity NOO
formal
Total equity NOO nonformal

2005
Men-owned

Women-owned

Men-owned

Mean
3.41
9.53
9.63
0.52
0.68
42,250
20,452
13,573
6,423

Sd.
4.39
9.27
8.72
0.5
0.47
138,373
90,600
61,174
63,921

Mean
4.54
14.25
13.66
0.39
0.55
58,282
41,449
27,156
17,354

Sd
5.52
10.73
10.13
0.49
0.5
169,471
149,094
108,241
112,796

Mean
3.55
9.68
9.86
0.54
0.66
47,257
18,802
11,547
6,831

Sd.
4.26
9.2
8.72
0.5
0.47
145,007
91,654
58,531
65,459

Mean
4.93
14.59
13.7
0.34
0.48
56,175
27,326
17,894
10,866

Sd.
6.03
10.76
10.06
0.47
0.5
166,450
121,486
89,907
86,744

4,404

61,559

15,134

112,911

5,493

72,470

11,148

104,267

2,593

34,910

2,492

36,675

1,364

19,976

1,325

25,610

2006
Women-owned
Variables
Mean
Sd
Size
3.51
4.86
Main owner experience
9.81
9.31
Mean experience
10.16
8.83
Home Operation
0.53
0.5
Competitive advantage
0.61
0.49
Total debt
45,294 143,786
Total equity
15,614 83,178
Total equity OO
9,776
52,732
Total equity NOO
6,034
65,247
Total equity NOO
3,459
55,940
formal
Total equity NOO non1,176
21,450
formal
Source: Kauffman Firm Survey, 2011 release.

2007
Men-owned

Women-owned

Men-owned

Mean
4.97
14.8
13.91
0.3
0.4
46,961
19,115
12,247
7,132

Sd
6.65
10.77
10.13
0.46
0.49
152,006
103,098
73,543
72,100

Mean
3.52
10.56
10.73
0.54
0.59
58,909
13,509
9,785
3,278

Sd
4.74
9.77
9.11
0.5
0.49
175,650
80,071
61,617
47,021

Mean
4.91
15.04
14.2
0.3
0.36
48,777
16,292
11,788
6,129

Sd
6.46
10.87
10.17
0.46
0.48
158,265
94,930
73,254
68,756

6,597

81,636

3,010

50,380

6,151

77,876

1,380

23,734

464

5,155

427

10,409
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Table 3.3 Continued
2008
Women-owned
Variables
Mean
Sd
Size
3.51
4.83
Main owner experience
10.7
9.58
Mean experience
10.97
9.02
Home Operation
0.53
0.5
Competitive advantage
0.48
0.5
Total debt
46,159 145,121
Total equity
11,050 74,331
Total equity OO
6,864
42,569
Total equity NOO
4,443
61,421
Total equity NOO
6,326
98,984
formal
Total equity NOO non229
2,222
formal
Source: Kauffman Firm Survey, 2011 release.

2009
Men-owned

Women-owned

Men-owned

Mean
4.81
15.12
14.36
0.29
0.31
44,278
15,661
10,835
5,980

Sd
6.45
10.77
10.11
0.46
0.46
153,747
94,471
70,857
68,201

Mean
3.51
10.7
10.97
0.53
0.48
46,159
11,050
6,864
4,443

Sd
4.83
9.58
9.02
0.5
0.5
145,121
74,331
42,569
61,421

Mean
4.81
15.12
14.36
0.29
0.31
44,278
15,661
10,835
5,980

Sd
6.45
10.77
10.11
0.46
0.46
153,747
94,471
70,857
68,201

5,612

75,327

6,326

98,984

5,612

75,327

757

17,808

229

2,222

757

17,808

Finally, Tables 4 and 5 show the industry choice for women- and men-owned firms. As
expected, we can see that a high percentage of women locate in the “retail trade” industry, with
15.4 percent (NAICS 44 and 45) of women-owned firms at startup in 2004. Surprisingly, the
“professional, scientific, and technical services” industry did better, with 21.84 percent of
women-owned firms starting in 2004. “Other services” is third, with 11.68 percent of women
choosing it for their firms in 2004. Lastly, “manufacturing” was another preferred industry for
women, with 10.79 percent. Excluding “professional, scientific, and technical services”97 from
the analysis, men seemed to be more present in the “manufacturing” and “construction”
industries. “Other services” is only the fourth industry where men choose to operate. Tables 3.4
and 3.5 clearly show a difference in genders’ industrial distribution.

97

As stated previously, the KFS oversampled firms in NAICS 54.
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Table 3.4
Women-Owned Firms’ Industry Distribution
2004
NAICS
11
21
23
31
32
33
42
44
45
48
49
51
52
53
54
55
56
61
62
71
72
81

Industry description
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and
hunting
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Retail trade
Transportation and warehousing
Transportation and warehousing
Information
Finance and Insurance
Real Estate and Rental and
Leasing
Professional, Scientific and Tech
serv
Management of companies and
enterprises
Adm and support and waste
management and remediation
Educational Services
Health Care and Social Assist
Arts, entertainment and recreation
Accommodation and food services
Other Services (except Public
adm)

Total

N
9

%
0.73

N
5

2007
%
0.73

N
3

2009
%
0.56

1
55
23
42
69
55
83
108
21
1
28
32
47

0.08
4.43
1.85
3.38
5.56
4.43
6.69
8.7
1.69
0.08
2.26
2.58
3.79

0
36
13
30
42
23
41
50
10
1
13
18
28

5.26
1.9
4.39
6.14
3.36
5.99
7.31
1.46
0.15
1.9
2.63
4.09

1
25
11
14
26
20
28
40
8
0
12
18
21

0.19
4.69
2.06
2.63
4.88
3.75
5.25
7.5
1.5
2.25
3.38
3.94

271

21.84

165

24.12

132

24.77

2

0.16

0

-

0

-

90

7.25

49

7.16

38

7.13

13
68
52
26
145

1.05
5.48
4.19
2.1
11.68

7
43
29
9
72

1.02
6.29
4.24
1.32
10.53

6
36
25
9
60

1.13
6.75
4.69
1.69
11.26

1241

100

684

100

533

100

Source: Tabulation of the Kauffman Firm Survey, 2011 release.
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Table 3.5
Men-Owned Firms’ Industry Distribution
2004

2007

2009

NAICS
11
21
22

Industry description
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting
Mining
Utilities

N
28
4
6

%
0.79
0.11
0.17

N
29
4
7

%
0.83
0.12
0.2

N
26
4
7

%
0.91
0.14
0.25

23
31
32

Construction
Manufacturing
Manufacturing

323
27
105

9.09
0.76
2.96

321
36
91

9.24
1.04
2.62

276
38
83

9.66
1.33
2.91

33
42
44
45
48
49
51
52
53

Manufacturing
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Retail trade
Transportation and warehousing
Transportation and warehousing
Information
Finance and Insurance
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing

431
160
197
131
76
9
131
150
127

12.13
4.5
5.55
3.69
2.14
0.25
3.69
4.22
3.58

360
177
198
150
72
6
119
140
135

10.36
5.09
5.7
4.32
2.07
0.17
3.42
4.03
3.88

299
146
144
114
57
6
95
91
106

10.47
5.11
5.04
3.99
2
0.21
3.33
3.19
3.71

54
55

Professional, Scientific and Tech serv
Management of companies and enterprises

891
7

25.08
0.2

875
5

25.18
0.14

748
5

26.18
0.18

56
61
62
71
72

Adm, support, waste management and remediation

Educational Services
Health Care and Social Assist
Arts, entertainment and recreation
Accommodation and food services

258
16
51
52
71

7.26
0.45
1.44
1.46
2

249
24
65
61
57

7.17
0.69
1.87
1.76
1.64

205
17
60
48
46

7.18
0.6
2.1
1.68
1.61

81
92

Other Services (except Public adm)
Public Administration

298
3

8.39
0.08

292
2

8.4
0.06

233
3

8.16
0.11

3552

100

3475

100

2857

100

Total
Source: Tabulation of the Kauffman Firm Survey, 2011 release.

3.4 The Empirics
•

Survival analysis
I use a Cox proportional hazard model throughout the entire survival analysis. Industry

fixed effects are controlled for throughout the survival analysis.
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•

A comparison of the women- and men-owned firms subsample
I first follow the empirical techniques set in some studies such as Boden and Nucci

(2000) and compare the survival prospects of women- and men-owned firms on the different
variables.
It has been explained throughout this paper that size is an important contributor to
survival. The literature has shown a difference in firms’ size, on average, between women- and
men-owned firms. Theoretically, I do not see a reason why the marginal increase of one
employee would be more beneficial for one gender’s firm’s survival over the other if the external
effects—such as the link between size and debt—are controlled. Whether or not this is true
remains an empirical issue. The second variable worth investigating is the effect of being a homeoperated business. I do expect that a business operated from home is more likely to fail than a
business operated from an office. However, whether or not one particular gender is more
penalized by operating from home is unclear. On the one hand, women are more likely to selfselect to work from home to take care of domestic tasks. Thus, if women are spending some
working hours on domestic tasks, it is reasonable to assume they are spending fewer hours on
their firms. On the other hand, men are less likely to self-select working from home and therefore
less likely to spend their working hours on domestic tasks. Therefore, a man’s choice to operate
his business from home is most likely the result of higher liquidity constraints98.
The financial sources a firm uses differ, on average, by gender. Literature has reported
that women are less likely to file requests for loans from financial institutions (Coleman and
Robb 2009). As Lee and Zhang did in their working paper, I differentiated the models by
breaking down the sources of equity.

98

According to Evans and Jovanovic (1989), one’s propensity to be self-employed—and his/her success—
is positively related to the entrepreneur’s wealth.
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I ran three models that can generally be written, at time (t), as:

h

j

+
+
+
+
+
+ )
(
(t ) = h0 (t ) e β 0 Size jt β size Home jt β Home Finance jt β finance Experience jt β exp erience CA jt β CA ε t ,

where

represents the hazard faced by subject j and

represents the baseline hazard that

everyone faces within the gender group. The variable size is the total number of employees in the
firm j. The variable “home” is equal to one (home=1) if the firm is operated from home. The
vector “finance” contains total debt and total equity used by j. The difference between the three
models relies on this last variable. The first model, M1, uses total debt and total equity values
while the other two models break down equity. The M2 model differentiates total equity between
owners-operators’ and non-owners operators’ equity. The M3 model differentiates non-ownersoperators’ equity from formal and informal sources. “Experience” is a proxy of human capital
that consists of the primary owner’s experience in the industry. Finally, “CA” (competitive
advantage) is a variable that proxies for owner’s confidence. Competitive advantage is equal to
one (CA=1) if the respondent believed the firm holds a competitive advantage over its
competition.
The results are presented in Table 3.6. Perhaps the most surprising result is that the
marginal effect of one employee is slightly more beneficial to women for survival (the difference
in coefficients is smaller than the standard errors). The same analysis can be done for one year of
“experience”. The results on “size” may be the caused 99 by women's style of leadership that
stresses the importance of a good relationship with their employees and a management style that
accentuates their employees’ motivation (Sheppard 1992). The belief of holding a competitive
advantage has a higher negative effect on failure for men. The results associated with men-owned
firms belief in holding a competitive advantage could be because men are more conservative

99

Further research is needed in order to find the reasons for this result.
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when estimating their competitive advantage or that men better understand how to use their
competitive advantage. Regarding the financial variables, overall, holding any kind of equity
increases failure rates (only the coefficient on non-owners-operators- non-formal equity on the
men-owned subsample is significant.); while holding debt seems to decrease failure rates (none of
the coefficients on debt is significant). These results echo Lee and Zhang’s findings. Finally,
operating a business increases failure rates in both subsamples, although the women subsample
has slightly lower coefficients for “home-operated”.
•

The survival analysis for women’s hazard rate
In this section, I seek a reason that could explain why women-owned firms are more

likely to exit. The empirical model makes use of interactive variables that would represent the
variables’ effects on women-owned firms. The variable of interest is “gender” which represents
women-owned-firms (gender=1 if the firm is owned by a woman). The basic model B0 seeks to
confirm that women are indeed more likely to exit.
Once this is established, I run successive models successively adding variables. Each
additional model is contingent on whether I have found the “gender” variable to be significant in
the previous model. First, among the most likely contenders to explain women-owned firms'
higher likelihood of exit, I expect the firm’s size to matter; also, women have a higher tendency
to run their businesses from home, which could also be a possible cause for women's higher
failure rates, as these two variables have a very large difference between women- and men-owned
firms. If none of these variables succeeds in explaining the gender coefficient, I add the financial
vector that includes “total debt” and “total equity.” The next option is to add the main owner’s
experience and its squared value to control for the non-monotonic trait of the experience function.
The last added control is “competitive advantage,” which is the closest proxy the KFS provides
that can be used for sociological and psychological differences between women and men.
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The model can generally be expressed as follows at time any time (t):

h

j

(
)
+
+
+(
×
+ )
(t ) = h 0 (t ) e β 0 Gender jt β gender X jt β X X jt Gender jt β x× g ε t ,

where “gender” represents a vector of dummies equal to one if the firm is owned by a woman
(gender=1 if j is woman-owned). X j represents the vector for the control variables100 discussed
above, and

(

X j × Genderj ) represents the vector of interactive variables. Note that the

coefficients in β X should be the ones from the corresponding variables on men-owned firms,
while β X × g represents the difference between the women- and men-owned coefficients in the
subsample survival analysis. The results are presented in Table 3.7.
The B0 model confirms that women-owned firms are indeed more likely to fail, as the
coefficient on gender is positive and statistically significant. The next model adds the firm’s size
and an interactive variable for women-owned firms’ size. As expected, the coefficient on firms’
size confirms that size decreases the men-owned firms’ hazard rate. However, the coefficient on
the size*gender indicates that the difference between women and men is not statistically
significant in the model. Moreover, the coefficient on gender is still positive and significant.
Therefore, I conclude that the difference in size among women- and men-owned firms cannot
explain the difference in survival rates within genders. M2 adds the home-operated business
dummy and its interactive variable. The results suggest that a home-based firm increases a menowned firm’s hazard rate, as the coefficient on home is positive and significant. The surprising
result is that the higher trend for women to operate their businesses from home does not explain
their higher failure rates. The coefficient on gender remains significant—and positive—while the
coefficient on home*gender is insignificant. The results found on total debt and the corresponding
interactive variable are insignificant, and I deduce that they, too, cannot explain the women-

100

Chi-squared tests were conducted on the different variables, and the results are presented in Appendix
3.3.

100

owned firms' higher likelihood of failure. The coefficient on the equity interactive variable is
insignificant, implying that this variable also fails to explain the reasons behind women-owned
firms' higher failure rates.
Adding experience (and experience squared) in M3 does not change the behavior of the
model. The coefficient on gender remains significant and increases again. So far, the coefficient
on gender increased from 0.132 to 0.302 while controlling for size, home-operation, use of debt
and equity and experience. Taking into account the results reported in Table 3.6, this is not
surprising. Women have better coefficients (for survival) in the variables used so far. Thus, it is
expected that controlling for these variables increases the coefficient on gender. Intuitively,
however, these results indicate that the negative effect on a firm’s survival probability for being
women-owned is increasing when the controls cited previously are added to the model.
The last model, M4, adds the competitive-advantage dummy variable. The coefficient on
gender becomes insignificant. The point estimate on gender drops from 0.302 to 0.194 (from M3
to M4) and increases overall from 0.132 to 0.194 (from B0 to M4). Unfortunately, the increase
from B0 to M4 is smaller in magnitude than the standard errors, and therefore both coefficients
can be considered similar. Therefore, the last model was also unable to explain women’s higher
failure rates on the firms’ survival.
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Table 3.6
Survival Analysis with Gender Subsamples
M1
VARIABLES

Size
Home-operated
Total debt
Total equity

M2

M3

Womenowned

Men-owned

Womenowned

Men-owned

Womenowned

Men-owned

-0.0704***
(0.0263)
0.270**
(0.129)
-0.00449
(0.0452)
-0.206
(0.174)

-0.0568***
(0.0130)
0.371***
(0.0858)
0.0200
(0.0237)
-0.120**
(0.0573)

-0.0739***
(0.0269)
0.285**
(0.129)
-0.0224
(0.0471)

-0.0605***
(0.0133)
0.377***
(0.0858)
0.0122
(0.0238)

-0.0740***
(0.0270)
0.286**
(0.130)
-0.0243
(0.0477)

-0.0593***
(0.0132)
0.381***
(0.0859)
0.0121
(0.0240)

-0.0244
(0.0937)
0.0105
(0.123)

-0.0877*
(0.0504)
0.0516
(0.0448)

-0.0252
(0.0931)

-0.0895*
(0.0499)

0.0547
(0.177)
0.0225
(0.132)
-0.0574***
(0.0197)
0.00146**
(0.000651)
-0.269**
(0.115)
4,257

0.184***
(0.0670)
0.0102
(0.0459)
-0.0439***
(0.0118)
0.000937***
(0.000327)
-0.497***
(0.0782)
12,539

Total equity owners-operators
Total equity non owners-operators
Total equity non owners-operators, non-formal
Total equity non owners-operators, formal
Experience

-0.0580***
-0.0441***
(0.0197)
(0.0118)
Experience squared
0.00148**
0.000937***
(0.000648)
(0.000327)
Competitive advantage
-0.270**
-0.487***
(0.115)
(0.0780)
Observations
4,255
12,528
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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-0.0575***
(0.0197)
0.00146**
(0.000651)
-0.269**
(0.115)
4,257

-0.0441***
(0.0118)
0.000939***
(0.000327)
-0.494***
(0.0780)
12,539

Table 3.7
Survival Analysis for the Gender Effect using Interaction Variables
VARIABLES
Gender
Size
Gender * Size

B0
0.132**
(0.0656)

M0
0.228**
(0.102)
-0.0870***
(0.0132)
-0.0101
(0.0306)

Home-operated
Home-operated * Gender

M1
0.269*
(0.146)
-0.0675***
(0.0126)
-0.0129
(0.0293)
0.396***
(0.0827)
-0.0735
(0.145)

M2
0.282*
(0.147)
-0.0652***
(0.0127)
-0.00898
(0.0288)
0.383***
(0.0835)
-0.0791
(0.146)
0.0284
(0.0230)
-0.0324
(0.0504)
-0.113**
(0.0522)
-0.0971
(0.186)

M3
0.302*
(0.182)
-0.0614***
(0.0132)
-0.0162
(0.0296)
0.396***
(0.0853)
-0.123
(0.147)
0.0228
(0.0238)
-0.0356
(0.0509)
-0.131**
(0.0582)
-0.0820
(0.188)
-0.0474***
(0.0117)
0.00102***
(0.000326)
-0.0123
(0.0224)
0.000446
(0.000724)

17,188

17,174

16,783

Total debt
Total debt * Gender
Total equity
Total equity * Gender
Experience
Experience squared
Experience * Gender
Experience squared *Gender
Competitive adv
Competitive adv * Gender
Observations
20,607
17,188
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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M4
0.194
(0.188)
-0.0554***
(0.0128)
-0.0183
(0.0292)
0.367***
(0.0853)
-0.119
(0.146)
0.0235
(0.0237)
-0.0324
(0.0506)
-0.120**
(0.0568)
-0.0918
(0.184)
-0.0445***
(0.0117)
0.000950***
(0.000325)
-0.0143
(0.0223)
0.000504
(0.000718)
-0.491***
(0.0777)
0.239*
(0.138)
16,783

3.6 Conclusion
This study updates the literature on the effects of gender differences on firms’ survival
rates. Using the KFS, a recent dataset that surveyed firms founded in 2004, I confirm the
literature findings that women-owned firms are more likely to fail. By separating the sample into
two subsamples of women- and men-owned firms, I compare the effects of previously studied
variables, such as firms’ size, human capital, financial capital use, and home-operated businesses
on survival. I add a variable never used previously, as far as I know: self-reported competitive
advantage, which proxies for owners’ confidence.
The summary statistics also showed that the percentage of women operating from home
was not decreasing as firms were aging, as opposed to men-owned firms. Moreover, the
percentage of women operating from home increased from 2004 to 2005. Considering that
operating from home is found to increase the hazard rate, I assume that this increase in homeoperated businesses was due to a flow of women-owned firms from a professional work
environment back to their home (maybe because they started a family). More research is needed
to determine whether this proposition is correct.
The model, which analyses both genders' subsamples, has been used before in the
literature. The results indicate that a marginal employee hired by a women-owned firm had a
greater contribution to survival than one marginal employee on men-owned firms. More research
towards genders’ different styles of management should be conducted to determine whether this
result was the product of greater employee motivation associated with women’s style of
management.
A marginal year of experience for the main owner in the industry the firm is competing in
had a similar contribution for each gender (although it was slightly higher for women), indicating
that experience is used similarly across genders. Thus, assuming that experience does play a role
in explaining genders’ differences in failure rates, it must be that it is the difference in experience
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levels that penalizes women-owned firms. Indeed, women are less experienced on average. The
genders-separated survival analysis also shows that women-owned firms’ self-reported belief in
holding a competitive advantage was a lower contributor for survival than it was for men-owned
firms. The summary statistics showed that women-owned firms, on average, thought more often
than men that they held a competitive advantage. The higher proportion of women-owned firms
to believe they held a competitive advantage is a hint that women-owned firms may be
overconfident (or men are more careful) in claiming they have a competitive advantage, which,
considering Koellinger, et al. (2007), should increase women-owned firms’ failure rates. The
results could also indicate that men better utilize their competitive advantage. I also find that
operating a business from home increases the hazard rate for both men and women. More
research is needed to assert with certainty which of the reasons stated previously is the most
plausible.
After confirming that women-owned firms are more likely to fail, I seek a reason using a
new survival model. With the use of gender-interactive variables, I investigate whether the
differences in the coefficients across genders found in the first survival model are important
enough to force women-owned firms to fail more frequently. I find that the difference in
coefficients for variables previously thought to be the reasons behind women-owned firms’
higher likelihood of failure were insignificant within the KFS.
Variables such as size, home-operated businesses, financing and experience were not
enough to explain the coefficient on gender. I added “competitive advantage” in the last model.
The difference in the gender coefficients on competitive advantage was significant, while gender
became insignificant. The coefficient on gender decreased from the previous model (M3) while
increasing from the base model (B0). Before me, Carter et al. (1997) had found that differences in
management styles were very important in analyzing genders firms’ survival.
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Despite findings that contribute to the literature by confirming that differences in
sociological and psychological factors across genders are part of the explanation for womenowned firms’ higher failure rates, this study was not able to explain the entire gender effect on
firms’ survival.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1
Appendix 1.1
Regressions results with the firm’s total number of employees variable including the
firm’s number of owner-operators. The first and second columns show the results of the first year
survival probability using 2004 conditions. The third and fourth columns show the results of the
probability of survival in the last year of the survey (2007) using founding conditions. The results
are pretty straightforward. Including the firm’s owner-operators to the number of employees for a
measure of size do not change anything in the regressions whether it be on current conditions or
on founding conditions (See Appendix 1.1 below for results).

Appendix 1.2
Regressions results using two measures of industry scale like Åstebro and Bernhardt
(2003) show that the second measure of scale (percentage of firms in the two digit sic industry
employing fewer than 50 employees) is not useful in my study. The second measure of scale is
found to be insignificant in the current conditions regression and both measure of scale are found
to be insignificant in the founding conditions regression (see Appendix 1.2 below for results).
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Appendix 1.1
Regressions Adding the Firm’s Owner-operators to the Number of Employees
Model

Control Variables in 2004

Total number of employees
without owners operator
Total number of employees
with owners operator
Relevance of experience
Quadratic of the relevance
of experience
Leverage between 0 and 1
Leverage equal to 1
Leverage greater than 1
Leverage is infinite
Portion in the industry with
fewer than 20 employees
Constant
Observations

M3 in first
year

M3 in first
year

Founding
conditions
using M3

Founding
conditions
using M3

Model
including
owneroperators in
total number
of employees

Model
excluding
owneroperators in
total
number of
employees
Probability
of Survival
in year
2005

Model
including
owneroperators in
total
number of
employees
Probability
of Survival
in year
2007

Model
excluding
owneroperators in
total number
of employees

0.027
(2.40)**
_

_

Probability
of Survival
in year 2005

_
0.025
(2.42)**
0.029
(3.06)***
-0.001
(2.49)**
0.169
(1.93)*
0.028
(0.3)
-0.15
(1.45)
-0.2
(2.08)**
1.958
(2.99)***
-0.36
(0.62)
4366

Probability of
Survival in
year 2007

0.018
(2.78)***
_

0.03
(3.10)***
-0.001
(2.54)**
0.166
(1.90)*
0.028
(0.29)
-0.153
(1.47)
-0.203
(2.11)**
1.949
(2.98)***
-0.318
(0.55)

0.019
(3.02)***
0.034
(5.01)***
-0.001
(3.91)***
0.028
(0.49)
0.01
(0.15)
-0.239
(3.18)***
-0.203
(2.84)***
1.096
(2.32)**
-0.331
(0.79)

0.034
(5.06)***
-0.001
(3.98)***
0.028
(0.48)
0.012
(0.18)
-0.24
(3.19)***
-0.205
(2.87)***
1.069
(2.26)**
-0.281
(0.67)

4366

4366

4366

Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Appendix 1.2

Regressions for Comparison using Åstebro and Bernhardt (2003) two Measures of Scale
Model

M3 on first year

Åstebro and
Bernhardt
(2003): on first
year

M3 on founding
conditions

Control Variables in 2004

Probability of
Survival in
year 2005
using one
measure of
industry scale
(M3)
0.027
(2.40)**
0.03
(3.10)***
-0.001
(2.54)**
0.166
(1.90)*
0.028
(0.29)
-0.153
(1.47)
-0.203
(2.11)**

Probability of
Survival in
year 2005
using two
measures of
industry scale
in M3
0.028
(2.48)**
0.029
(3.06)***
-0.001
(2.50)**
0.168
(1.92)*
0.032
(0.33)
-0.149
(1.43)
-0.203
(2.12)**

Probability of
Survival in
year 2007
using one
measure of
industry scale
(M3)
0.018
(2.78)***
0.034
(5.06)***
-0.001
(3.98)***
0.028
(0.48)
0.012
(0.18)
-0.24
(3.19)***
-0.205
(2.87)***

Åstebro and
Bernhardt
(2003) on
founding
conditions
Probability of
Survival in
year 2007
using two
measures of
industry scale
in M3
0.019
(2.77)***
0.034
(5.05)***
-0.001
(3.96)***
0.028
(0.48)
0.013
(0.19)
-0.239
(3.18)***
-0.205
(2.87)***

1.949

3.028

1.069

1.201

(2.98)***

(1.97)**

(2.26)**

-1.04

_

-2.484
(0.77)
1.101
(0.57)

_
-0.281
(0.67)

-0.299
(0.12)
-0.112
(0.08)

4366

4366

Total number of employees
Relevance of experience
Quadratic of the relevance
of experience
Leverage between 0 and 1
Leverage equal to 1
Leverage greater than 1
Leverage is infinite
Portion in the industry with
fewer than 20 employees
Portion in the industry with
fewer than 50 employees
Constant

-0.318
(0.55)

4366
4366
Observations
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Appendix 1.3
Linear Regressions of Size
Total number of
employees
Relevance of
experience
Quadratic of the
relevance of experience
Leverage between 0 and 1

2005

2006

2007

0.041
0.115
0.114
(2.36)**
(4.56)*** (3.92)***
-0.001
-0.002
-0.003
(1.54)
(3.20)*** (3.13)***
0.79
1.174
1.291
(5.50)*** (6.19)*** (5.94)***
Leverage equal to 1
2.122
1.733
2.145
(12.85)*** (6.86)*** (7.50)***
Leverage greater than 1
0.584
0.28
-0.295
(2.91)***
-0.9
-0.81
Leverage is infinite
-0.081
0.119
-0.164
(0.43)
(0.36)
(0.43)
Constant
0.791
1.28
1.551
(5.60)*** (6.52)*** (6.79)***
Observations
4582
3664
3092
R-squared
0.04
0.03
0.03
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Appendix 2
Appendix 2.1: Chi-Square Test Results
A Wald test is used for each variable after a full model was run. The tests have two
degrees

of

freedom

Appendix 2.1.1:

because

they

compare

three

coefficients

for

each

variable.

; The effect of the variable on each group is the same. The

coefficients between SPs, PPs and PBs are not significantly different. For each variable in the
vector x:

(See Appendix 2.1.1 below).
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Appendix 2.1.1

Appendix 2.1.2:

Variables
Capital per worker
Expenses per worker
Owners’ experience
Size
Assets
Industry wage

chi2( 2)
11.3
0.71
1.28
7.82
9
2.01

* The null hypothesis
** The null hypothesis

cannot be rejected.
is rejected

Prob > chi2
0.0035**
0.3997*
0.5273*
0.0200**
0.0111**
0.3654*

; The coefficients for SPs are PPs are significantly equal to 0. For each
0 (See Appendix 2.1.2 below).

variable in the vector x:

Appendix 2.1.2
Variables
Capital per worker
Expenses per worker
Owners’ experience
Size
Assets
Industry wage

chi2( 2)
16.28
6.18
5.46
24.23
7.76
1.69

* The null hypothesis
** The null hypothesis

cannot be rejected.
is rejected

Prob > chi2
0.0003**
0.0456**
0.0652**
0.0000**
0.0207**
0.4304*

Appendix 3
Appendix 3.2
Probit Regressions on Gender for Firms Operating From Home.

VARIABLES
Gender T-1
Constant
Observations

T=2005

T=2006

T=2007

T=2008

T=2009

Homeoperated

Homeoperated

Homeoperated

Homeoperated

Homeoperated

0.0927**
-0.0417
-0.285***
-0.0213
4,789

0.306***
-0.0451
-0.473***
-0.0212
4,789

0.552***
-0.0489
-0.667***
-0.0216
4,789

0.646***
-0.0527
-0.738***
-0.0216
4,789

0.707***
-0.0559
-0.804***
-0.0218
4,789

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The probit regression above clearly shows that being women-owned increases every year—
coefficients are positive and significant—the probability of being home-operated every year.
Appendix 3.1
Summary Statistics Details for Financial Variables.

Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Skewness

Total debt
2004
1237
54301.08
155150.3
3.314858

Total equity
2004
1234
37105.59
117102.3
4.249769

Total equity OO
2004
1237
38528.27
114847.8
4.315237

Total equity NOO
2004
1237
12873.97
83119.24
7.516754

Kurtosis

13.3611

20.44443

21.18427

63.28097

Women -Owned

Appendix 3.1 Continued
Total debt
2004
3552
79840.29
200220.4
2.840198
10.47714

Men -Owned
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis

Total equity
2004
3540
68135.54
179050.3
3.261514
13.39233

Total equity OO
2004
3552
63690.61
161806.3
3.340379
13.95409

Total equity NOO
2004
3552
26433.73
130710
5.669601
36.36728

Appendix 3.3: Chi- Squared Tests.
: The effect of the variable on each group is the same. The coefficients between men and
(women-men) are statistically similar.
∗

Variables

chi2( 1)

Prob > chi2

Size

1.01

0.31*

Home-operated

4.24

0.0396**

Total debt

0.83

0.3632*

Total equity

0.05

0.8249*

Experience

1.21

0.2718*

Competitive Advantage

13.36

0.0003**

* The null hypothesis
** The null hypothesis

cannot be rejected.
is rejected.
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